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Abstract
Both credit default swap (CDS) and options markets often experience ab-
normal swings prior to the announcement of negative credit news. With the
exclusion of negative earnings announcements, we ﬁnd that options prices reveal
information about such forthcoming adverse events at least as early as do credit
spreads. Prior to negative credit news being publicly disclosed, we ﬁnd that the
equity market does not respond to abnormal movement in options prices unless
that information has also manifested itself in the CDS market. A potential
explanation is that options are more likely to trade on unsubstantiated rumors
than are default swaps.
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11. Introduction
In the recent past, there have been dramatic spikes in the prices of credit default swaps
(CDS), over-the-counter securities that provide default insurance on debt. These con-
tracts are popular among commercial banks, hedge funds, and other big investors.
In some prominent cases, including deals involving hospital operator HCA Inc. and
energy company Anadarko Petroleum, prices of the default swaps climbed in the days
before news of major acquisitions became public (Scannell and Ng, 2006). This sug-
gests that some traders might have acted on inside information, especially since CDS
contracts are negotiated privately and over the phone, not on a regulated exchange.
Acharya and Johnson (2007a)—in an important contribution to the literature—
use news reﬂected in the stock market as a benchmark for public information and
identify a signiﬁcant incremental revelation of information in the CDS market for
adverse credit news and for ﬁrms that subsequently experience adverse shocks. The
degree of advance information increases with the number of banks that have lending
or monitoring relationships with the given ﬁrm. The authors argue that these ﬁndings
are consistent with the use of nonpublic information by informed banks.
This paper extends the analysis in Acharya and Johnson (2007a) by treating
information reﬂected in the stock market or the options market as the benchmark
against which to measure incremental information revelation in CDS markets. There
is strong evidence that options-market news contains information about future stock
prices. For example, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Pan and Poteshman
(2006) ﬁnd that signed options trading volume can help forecast future stock returns.
Cao, Chen, and Griﬃn (2005), among others, document abnormal trading volume in
options markets prior to take-over announcements.
Anecdotal evidence of both credit spreads and options prices revealing information
prior to the stock market can be found in the case of Harrah’s Entertainment’s recent
leveraged buyout (LBO) announcement. On October 2, 2006 the world’s biggest
gambling operator received a $15 billion buyout oﬀer from two private equity ﬁrms.
2The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article “Trading in Harrah’s Contracts Surges Before
LBO Disclosure” from October 4, 2006 describes how both options and derivatives
markets experienced abnormal swings two days prior to the announcement, whereas
the stock market was much slower to respond.
We present more extensive empirical evidence that both CDS and options markets
often experience abnormal upward swings prior to the announcement of negative
credit news.1 Acharya and Johnson (2007a) identify such adverse events as times
when credit spreads widen by 50 basis points over a one-day period. We deviate from
using an absolute threshold for a number of reasons: First, a 50-basis-point spread
increase is more common and often represents a less dramatic event for low-credit-
quality ﬁrms than for investment-grade ﬁrms. Second, the increase might stem from
a sudden industry- or market-wide surge in spreads rather than from a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
event. Although a conditional ﬂow of information from the CDS market is of interest
either way, the observed lead–lag relationships are potentially quite diﬀerent for these
two scenarios.
Third, credit spreads may widen due to or in anticipation of value-deteriorating
news or debt-deteriorating news. News releases that represent an adverse shock to
both equity and bond holders of a company are labeled value-deteriorating. Exam-
ples include announcements of accounting irregularities, fraud, lower-than-expected
earnings and lowering of forecasts. Debt-deteriorating news releases, on the other
hand, are announcements that represent an adverse shock to the creditors of a ﬁrm
but that leave equity holders equally or even better oﬀ. In this sense, they are likely
to lead to a widening of credit spreads while stock prices stay ﬂat or even increase.
An example are announcements that the ﬁrm is the target of a LBO deal.
Recognizing that news that widens credit spreads can be classiﬁed into these two
categories will help detect not just a conditional ﬂow of information from the CDS
and the options markets to the equity market, but also in correctly measuring the
sign and magnitude of such incremental spillover eﬀects. For example, Figs. 1 and 2
1We focus exclusively on negative types of events because Acharya and Johnson (2007a) ﬁnd that
there are no signiﬁcant ﬂows from CDS to equity markets for positive information events.
3show the daily returns on stocks, options, and default swaps for a debt-deteriorating
news event (HCA Inc.) and for a value-deteriorating announcement (Delphi Corp.),
respectively. Hospital operator HCA announced that it had agreed to a $21 billion
buyout for a 6.5% premium on July 24, 2006. Fig. 1 shows that CDS rates rose in the
week leading up to the announcement. Put-option-implied volatilities as well as stock
prices dramatically increased two days prior to the news release, with HCA’s shares
climbing to a high on the day of the announcement and trading fairly ﬂat at that level
the week after. For HCA, implied volatilities dramatically decrease after the initial
upward jump, to a level signiﬁcantly lower than before the information was revealed.
Auto-parts supplier Delphi, on the other hand, disclosed further accounting problems
on March 7, 2005. Here, the picture looks somewhat reversed. All three markets show
a strong adjustment four days prior to the announcement, with credit spreads and
put-implied volatilities dramatically increasing, and with signiﬁcant negative returns
on stocks.
To address the ﬁrst issue, we replace the 50-basis-point rule with an alternative
deﬁnition of adverse credit-market events. The second and third issues are dealt
with by studying the revelation of information in credit, options, and equity markets
around adverse ﬁrm-speciﬁc announcements. To identify ﬁrm-speciﬁc news releases,
we run a full-text search of all WSJ articles since 2002, obtaining a total of more
than 21,750 articles related to ﬁrms in our sample. Among those we then search for
announcements that signal a potentially adverse eﬀect on the value of the company’s
debt. In particular, we collect announcements related to accounting irregularities and
fraud (Type A), lower-than-expected earnings or lowered forecasts (Type E), the ﬁrm
selling a unit or assets (Type S), the ﬁrm buying another company or unit (Type B),
and the ﬁrm being a target of a leveraged buyout (Type L).
The ﬁrst contribution of our paper is a rigorous investigation of whether or to
what extent the credit market acquires information prior to the options market, or
vice versa. Our results indicate that (i) investors absorb information revealed in the
CDS market into prices of equity options within a few days and vice versa, (ii) the
4incremental conditional information ﬂow from CDS to options markets is signiﬁcant
for high-yield and for highly volatile ﬁrms, and (iii) there is a strong conditional
spillover from the options market to the CDS market during the week around a
dramatic increase in implied volatility, as well as for highly volatile ﬁrms.
Running the horse race between the credit market and the options market shows
that in general there is no clear winner: With the exclusion of negative earnings
announcements, we ﬁnd that options prices reveal information about forthcoming
negative credit news at least as early as do credit spreads. Prior to certain adverse
credit-market events, notably the disclosure of accounting scandals, we even ﬁnd that
the incremental information revelation in the options market relative to the CDS
market is signiﬁcant.
Our second contribution is to quantify the joint contribution of the CDS market
and the options market to price discovery relative to the stock market. We ﬁnd that
(i) the unconditional ﬂow of information from the credit and the options market to
the equity market is negative but very small, (ii) the incremental spillover eﬀect from
CDS to equity markets is more negative for highly volatile and for large ﬁrms, (iii)
conditional spillover eﬀects from options to equity markets are stronger for highly
volatile ﬁrms and for smaller ﬁrms, (iv) there is a strong conditional spillover from
CDS to equity markets for announcements of Type E, S and L, even after controlling
for the news revealed in options prices, and (v) with the exception of Type L news,
we do not detect any incremental spillover eﬀects from options to equity markets for
announcement types A, E, S or B. And even for leveraged buyout announcements, the
equity market ﬁrst reacts to news in credit spreads and only afterwards to movement
in options prices.
For all ﬁve types of announcements A, E, S, B and L we ﬁnd that the equity
market does not respond to abnormal movement in options prices in the period prior
to the news being publicly disclosed unless that information has also manifested itself
in the CDS market. A potential explanation is that options are more likely to trade
on unsubstantiated rumors than default swaps are. We substantiate this conjecture
5by analyzing the diﬀerences in CDS-market and options-market participants, and by
oﬀering empirical evidence that dramatic upward jumps in implied volatilities are
revised more frequently and sooner than are dramatic upward jumps in CDS.
News unrelated to negative credit news may set oﬀ so-called “piggyback” buying
from options traders hoping to catch a lucky break. Berman and Ng (2006) argue that
in many of these instances, such as for Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc.,
the trading stir ends in a whimper and no deal ever materializes. As a result, if there
is a sudden upward jump in implied volatility that is not accompanied by a reaction
in credit spreads that day or shortly afterwards, equity-market participants may be
more likely to believe that the change in option prices was due to unsubstantiated
rumors rather than new information.
The third contribution of our paper is to propose a framework for the arrival and
transmission of information in CDS, options and equity markets. The model allows for
credit-market and options-market participants to have access to insider information
about forthcoming adverse events, and the latter may also trade on unsubstantiated
rumors. The speciﬁcation of stock returns captures the notion that investors in equity
markets are strongly adverse to trading on rumors. Stock prices will adopt to new
information only when it is publicly announced, or if it is revealed through a dramatic
surge in credit spreads prior to the news release. A simulation study shows that the
proposed model, although very simple, is rich enough to capture the essence of our
empirical ﬁndings.
Related Literature
The existing literature on the information ﬂow between the CDS, options, and equity
markets focuses either on (i) the CDS, bond, and equity markets only; (ii) the options
and equity markets only; or (iii) the explanatory power of implied volatilities and
option-implied jump risk premia for credit spreads. All three strands of the literature
are brieﬂy reviewed below. Two exceptions are the concurrent works by Cao, Yu,
and Zhong (2007) and by Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2007). The former paper
examines unconditional lead-lag relationships between CDS, options and equity mar-
6kets for diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms, whereas the latter shows that disagreement among
investors consistently impacts credit spreads, stock returns, and the volatility smile
of individual options.
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) show that for a sample of high-grade credits
there is a greater price discovery in the CDS market than in the bond market, although
the reverse seems to occur as well. Norden and Weber (2007) look at the comovement
of the CDS, bond, and stock markets and ﬁnd that the stock market generally leads
the CDS and bond markets, that the CDS market is more responsive to the stock
market than to the bond market, and that the CDS market plays a more important
role in price discovery than the bond market does. Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
examine the weekly lead–lag relationships between CDS spread changes, corporate
bond spreads, and stock returns for U.S. ﬁrms using a VAR framework. Their results
show that the stock and CDS markets lead the corporate bond market. Somewhat
in contrast to Acharya and Johnson (2007a), the authors argue that there is no clear
leader between the stock market and the CDS market.
Focusing on lead-lag relationships between equity and equity options, Chakravarty,
Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) argue that option trading contributes to price discovery
in the underlying stock market. Informed traders trade in both stocks and options,
suggesting an important informational role for options. Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas
(1998) and Pan and Poteshman (2006) ﬁnd that signed trading volume in the options
markets can help forecast future stock returns. Cao, Chen, and Griﬃn (2005), among
others, document abnormal trading volume in the options market prior to take-over
announcements. Our paper contributes to this strand of the literature by investigating
price discovery in the options market, while controlling for the information content
of the CDS market.
With regard to the explanatory power of options-market information for credit
spreads, Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2007) ﬁnd that at the ﬁrm level, contemporaneous
option-implied volatilities dominate historical volatilities in explaining CDS spreads.
(Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2005) and Hilscher (2007) have simi-
7lar results for corporate bond yield spreads.) To accommodate the nonlinear relation
between CDS spreads and implied volatility, Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2007) estimate a
structural credit risk model called “CreditGrades.” In contrast, Cremers, Driessen,
Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2005) and Zhang, Zhu, and Zhu (2005) explain default
swap spreads with option-implied jump risk premia.
Finally, there are a two event studies that relate to our work. Norden and Weber
(2004) analyze credit and equity markets around announcements of rating changes,
and, in a recent paper, Acharya and Johnson (2007b) focus on private equity buy-
outs and investigate whether the number of ﬁnancing participants is related to the
likelihood of insider trading prior to the bid announcement.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data,
discusses the econometric techniques employed in the paper, and provides details
on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc announcements studied. As a preliminary analysis, Section 3
investigates the cross-correlation structure between CDS, options, and equity markets.
Section 4 describes our ﬁndings regarding the ﬂow of information from the CDS
market to the options market and vice versa, and Section 5 extends the analysis to
include the equity market. In Section 6, we propose a model of information arrival
and transmission for credit, options and equity markets that is rich enough to capture
the essence of our empirical ﬁndings. Finally, Section 7 discusses our conjecture that
the options market trades on unsubstantiated rumors more frequently than does the
default swap market, and then concludes.
2. Data and Deﬁnitions
2.1. Data
Our analysis is based on daily CDS, options, and equity data for 144 U.S. ﬁrms
from nine industries: basic materials (10 ﬁrms), consumer goods (24), consumer
services (14), healthcare (20), industrials (18), oil and gas (21), technology (10),
telecommunications (12), and utilities (15). It covers the period from January 1,
82002 to November 8, 2006. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. For each
sector, we report the number of ﬁrms, the average number of daily default swap
observations per ﬁrm, the median CDS rate, and the distribution of the median S&P
long-term issuer rating for the ﬁrms in that sector. Table 1 indicates that the range
of credit scores is concentrated around medium credit quality, with the majority of
the ﬁrms having a BBB rating.
We now describe the data sources for the CDS, options, and equity markets in turn.
A CDS is an over-the-counter derivative security that provides bond insurance. Fueled
by participation from commercial banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies, CDS
markets have grown exponentially over the past 10 years, reaching an outstanding
notional value of more than $34.4 trillion dollars in 2006 (International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, 2007). The buyer of protection in a CDS contract pays a
quarterly insurance premium until the expiration of the contract or until default by
the reference entity, whichever occurs ﬁrst. In return, the seller of protection pays to
the buyer of protection the diﬀerence between the face value and the market value
of the referenced debt. This compensation can be through physical delivery or cash
delivery, with the former being more common.
CDS rates are quoted as annualized percentages of the notional value of the debt
covered. Using an actual 360-day convention, the CDS rate is equal to four times
the quarterly premium. Default swap spreads are provided by Markit and consist
of daily ﬁve-year at-market CDS rates for senior-unsecured U.S.-dollar-denominated
debt. Here, at-market denotes the premium rate at which the market value of the
CDS contract at initiation is equal to zero. For our data, default events are triggered
by bankruptcy, failure by the obligor to make payments on its debt, or a debt restruc-
turing that is materially adverse to the interests of the creditors. For the latter, the
modiﬁed ISDA contractual standards apply. In the case of physical settlement, mod-
iﬁed debt restructuring restricts deliverable obligations to those that mature within
30 months of the CDS contract’s maturity. For a debt restructuring event, this sig-
niﬁcantly decreases heterogeneity with regard to maturity, and hence market value,
9of the various deliverables.
Firm-by-ﬁrm pricing data for equity options are available from OptionMetrics.
We download daily data on individual option-implied volatilities for standardized 60-
day at-the-money (ATM) put options. In OptionMetrics, implied volatilities (IV) of
standardized options are computed by linearly interpolating the volatility surface to
match the target expiration and the forward price, the underlying security’s calculated
price at expiration. A standardized option is only included if there are enough option-
price data on that date to accurately interpolate the required values. For each ﬁrm
in our sample, we also download the daily total contract volume for calls and puts.
Daily closing prices for equity are downloaded from CRSP. To compute the distance-
to-default measure in Section 2.2, we also access Compustat items 45 (Debt in Current
Liabilities), 49 (Current Liabilities Total), and 51 (Long-Term Debt Total), as well
as the numbers of shares outstanding from CRSP. Quarterly reported balance-sheet
variables are interpolated linearly over the days in our sample.
2.2. Econometric Analysis
Price movements in equity, options, and credit markets are closely linked. To
measure the ﬂow of information originating from either the options market or the
CDS market, we need to disentangle news arriving in one market from that present
in other markets at the same time. After isolating innovations in the options and
CDS markets, we discuss our choice of adverse options- and credit-market conditions
under which we study the ﬂow of information between the two derivatives markets
and from the derivatives markets to the primary equity market. To better gauge
the impact of adverse options- and credit-market events on the information ﬂow, we
identify events associated with either value- or debt-deteriorating news and replace
options- and credit-condition dummies with announcement dummies for speciﬁc news
categories. We now describe the econometric analysis involved in each of these steps.
102.2.1. CDS and IV Innovations
Within the standard structural framework of corporate default introduced by Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), the relationship between percentage changes
in credit spreads and equity returns is highly nonlinear. Fig. 3 shows the elasticity of
credit spreads with respect to the value of equity as implied by the Black–Scholes–
Merton model. The top panel relates this elasticity to the inverse of the level of credit
spreads, whereas the bottom panel shows the elasticity of credit spreads as a function
of the ﬁrm’s distance to default (DD). Credit spreads on the x-axis range from 10 to
2,000 basis points, covering the range of spreads observed in our data. Acharya and
Johnson (2007a) show the portion of the plot in the top panel of Fig. 3 that relates to
credit spreads between 200 and 1,000 basis points. Most of the liquidity in the CDS
market, however, stems from investment-grade ﬁrms, many of which trade at spreads
far below 200 basis points.
The DD is deﬁned as the number of standard deviations of asset growth with
respect to the risk-neutral measure by which assets exceed a standardized measure of
liabilities. In the Black–Scholes–Merton framework, risk-neutral default probabilities
are a direct function of DD. The latter covariate is constructed along the lines of
Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) using CRSP equity data and Compustat book liabil-
ities. For our CDS sample, more than 85% of the quotes are below 200 basis points.
Moreover, 90% of the default swap rates fall between 16 and 422 basis points, with a
median spread of 51 basis points. For the model underlying Fig. 3 and an assumed
asset volatility of 25%, credit spreads of 16, 51, 200, and 420 basis points compare
to a DD of 2.41, 1.96, 1.31, and 0.88, respectively. A comparison of the two panels
in Fig. 3 suggests that, for the range of credit spreads in our sample, the relation
between spread elasticity and DD is close to aﬃne, more so than that between spread
elasticity and the inverse level of credit spreads.
To identify information arriving in the CDS markets that has not yet been revealed
in the equity or options markets, we therefore regress percentage changes in CDS
(CDSrtn) on contemporaneous and past stock returns (STKrtn), the product of those
11with DD, on percentage changes in implied volatilities (IVrtn), and on the past ﬁve
lags of percentage changes in credit spreads. To account for the possibility that
the elasticity of credit spreads with respect to the level of implied volatilities may
be diﬀerent for low-credit-quality ﬁrms from those for high-credit-quality ﬁrms, we
also include interactions of percentage changes in individual implied volatilities (both













































We refer to the residuals CDSinnov
i
e,o(t) as innovations in the CDS market relative to
the equity and options markets. Similarly, we use (1) to estimate innovations in the
CDS market relative to the equity market, CDSinnov
i
e(t), and innovations in the CDS
market relative to the options market, CDSinnov
i





t−k = 0, respectively.
Innovations in the options markets are estimated in a similar fashion. For each
ﬁrm, we regress percentage changes in IV on contemporaneous and past stock returns,
the product of those with DD, on percentage changes in CDS rates, the product of
those with DD, and on the past ﬁve lags of percentage changes in implied volatilities.












































where the residuals IVinnov
i
e,c(t) are interpreted as innovations in the options markets
12relative to the equity and CDS markets. Finally, we also estimate innovations in the
options markets relative to the equity market, IVinnov
i
e(t), and innovations in the
options markets relative to the CDS market, IVinnov
i





t−k = 0 in (2), respectively.
2.2.2. Adverse Credit and Volatility Conditions
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the adverse credit conditions under which we
study the ﬂow of information from the CDS market to the options and equity markets.
Afterwards, we introduce a set of volatility-condition variables that will be used to
analyze the information ﬂow originating from options markets.
For the purpose of this study, an adverse credit-market event is identiﬁed as a
dramatic upward jump in CDS rates. For a given ﬁrm i, an upward jump in CDS



















t−1 denotes the daily change in default swap rates and Φ








denote the sample mean and sample standard deviation of ﬁrm i’s
daily changes in default swap rates. When computing the sample movements, we
use data spanning the whole period from January 2002 to November 2006 instead of
an alternative speciﬁcation that computes the sample averages in (3) using a moving
window of, say, 30 or 60 days leading up to time t. One disadvantage of the latter
speciﬁcation is that following periods where spreads were relatively ﬂat, any moderate
move in rates translates into an adverse credit event for the ﬁrm even though the
change in spreads most likely did not signal a drastic deterioration of its credit quality.
To study the conditional ﬂow of information around adverse credit-market events,
we introduce a set of credit-condition dummies to identify the three days prior to a
2We have repeated the empirical analysis in this paper for cutoﬀ levels of 0.95 and 0.975 and
conﬁrmed that our ﬁndings are robust with regard to these choices.
13jump in CDS rates, the day of the event, and the three days immediately following
it. For each ﬁrm i,
• D
pre,i
∆CDS(s) equals one if (3) holds for t ∈ {s+1,s+2,s+3} and zero otherwise,
• D
at,i
∆CDS(s) equals one if (3) holds for t = s and zero otherwise, and
• D
post,i
∆CDS(s) equals one if (3) holds for t ∈ {s−1,s−2,s−3} and zero otherwise.
The set of volatility-condition variables we use to analyze the ﬂow of information
from the options markets to the CDS and equity markets relies on a deﬁnition of IV




























sample mean and standard deviation of ﬁrm i’s daily changes in implied volatilities.
For each ﬁrm i,
• D
pre,i
∆IV(s) equals one if (4) holds for t ∈ {s + 1,s + 2,s + 3} and zero otherwise,
• D
at,i
∆IV(s) equals one if (4) holds for t = s and zero otherwise, and
• D
post,i
∆IV (s) equals one if (4) holds for t ∈ {s−1,s−2,s−3} and zero otherwise.
2.2.3. Option Volume
In addition to individual option-implied volatilities, we rely on options trading





the total call and put contract volume for ﬁrm i on date t, respectively. Similarly













3Ideally, we would also like to explore the eﬀect of signed options volume as in Easley, O’Hara,
and Srinivas (1998) or of buyer-initiated options trades as in Pan and Poteshman (2006). Such data,















denote the full-sample mean and standard deviation of ﬁrm i’s daily changes in total
put contract volume. For each ﬁrm i,
• D
pre,i
∆VlmP(s) equals one if (5) holds for t ∈ {s+1,s+2,s+3} and zero otherwise,
• D
at,i
∆VlmP(s) equals one if (5) holds for t = s and zero otherwise, and
• D
post,i
∆VlmP(s) equals one if (5) holds for t ∈ {s−1,s−2,s−3} and zero otherwise.
Similar notation will be used for upward jumps in call option volume and the call-
volume-condition dummy, after replacing VlmP with VlmC.
2.3. Announcements
We start by compiling a complete list of announcements with regard to ﬁrms in our
sample. For each ﬁrm we run a full-text search of all WSJ articles since January 2002
that contain one or more substrings related to the company’s name (such as AOL and
Time Warner for Time Warner, Inc). This results in more than 21,750 newspaper
articles. Among the articles for a given ﬁrm, we then search for news releases that
signal a potentially adverse eﬀect on the value of that ﬁrm’s debt. This is facilitated
by searching for keywords associated with four diﬀerent types of announcements:
A: Accounting irregularities or fraud
Keywords: accounting, fraud, error, irregularit(ies), inquiry, restate, and delay.
E: Lower-than-expected earnings or forecast lowered
Keywords: earning(s), forecast, loss, and proﬁt
S: Firm is selling unit or assets
Keywords: buy, sell, acqui(sition,re), and spinoﬀ
B: Firm is buying another company or unit
Keywords: buy, sell, acqui(sition,re), and spinoﬀ
15L: Firm is target of leveraged buyout
Keywords: LBO, buyout
We focus on negative types of events since typically there are no signiﬁcant ﬂows
from CDS to equity markets for positive information events (Acharya and Johnson
(2007a)).
We anticipate that announcements that fall into categories A, E, and, to a lesser
extent, S are likely to be value deteriorating. In other words, these announcements
are likely to signal bad news for both creditors and equity holders of the company.
Announcements of Type L often imply higher leverage and hence a lower value of debt
for the ﬁrm, but might actually be good news for equity holders. Our intuition is
that many of these LBO announcements reﬂect debt-deteriorating news. Categorizing
Type B news as value-deteriorating or debt-deteriorating is less straight-forward.
For our sample period, the average ﬁrm has 1.0 announcements of Type A, 3.1
of Type E, 1.1 of Type S and 1.4 of Type B. We were able to compile a list of
ten ﬁrms with LBO announcements for which we have access to all required data:
CDS, OptionMetrics, CRSP, and Compustat. Details are provided in Table 2. For a
subset of these ten ﬁrms, either Markit CDS rates were not available or the leveraged
buyout was announced after the end of our Markit CDS sample on November 8,
2006. In these cases, we augment our existing data with default swap rates from
Datastream. Datastream obtains CDS rate quotes from the DataVision CDS product
by Credit Market Analysis (CMA). CMA receives CDS spreads from a range of market
contributors. These contributors consist of both buy- and sell-side institutions active
in the ﬁxed-income markets such as asset managers, hedge funds, and banks. Market
activity among CMA’s sources depends on their need to buy or sell default protection.
To ensure reliability of the quotes, we only use rates identiﬁed as actual trades, ﬁrm
indications, or indications. CMA data is available from January 2003 until December
2006.
For each announcement category anmt ∈ {A, E, S, B, L}, a dummy variable is
constructed. In particular, for a given ﬁrm i,
16• D
pre,i
anmt(s) equals one if an announcement of type anmt occurred on date t ∈
{s + 1,s + 2,s + 3} and zero otherwise,
• D
at,i




anmt (s) equals one if an announcement of type anmt occurred on date t ∈
{s − 1,s − 2,s − 3} and zero otherwise.
To avoid overlapping dummy variables, we exclude news items released within seven
days of a previous announcement of the same type.
In the last part of this section, we investigate the link between jumps in CDS,
IV, VlmC and VlmP, and compare how they match up with the arrival time of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc announcements of Types A, E, S, and B. Fig. 4 shows that upward jumps in
implied volatilities coincide with upward jumps in CDS for less than ten percent of
the latter. That value is even lower when comparing the timing of upward jumps in
call-option volume or in put-option volume to that of upward jumps in credit spreads.
Fig. 5 plots the distribution of jumps in default swap rates and implied volatilities
around announcement days for each news category. We ﬁnd that announcements
relating to accounting irregularities or fraud (Type A) and to lower-than-expected
earnings or lowered forecasts (Type E) often lead to dramatic upward jumps in both
CDS rates and implied volatilities. We observe jumps in spreads and jumps in IV
on more than 13% of announcement dates of Type A, and on more than 7% of
announcement dates of Type E. More interesting, however, is the fact that in more
than 5% of the scenarios, a jump in prices can already be observed one day before
the news is released. For announcement category B, this fraction is somewhat lower
at 3% to 4%. No clear pattern is established for news of Type S.
Fig. 6 plots the distribution of jumps in options volume around announcement
days for each news category. As with derivatives prices, we ﬁnd that announcements
of Types A and E often lead to dramatic upward jumps in put and, to a lesser extent,
call option volume. In particular, we observe that in almost 10% and more than 15%
17of the Type A and Type E scenarios, a large upward jump in put option volume can
already be observed one day prior to the news release.
3. The Cross-Correlation Structure between CDS,
Options and Equity Markets
We begin our empirical analysis by studying the cross-correlation structure between
credit default swap, options and equity markets. Fig. 7 shows the pairwise cross-
correlation between daily percentage changes in CDS rates at time t and daily per-
centage changes in implied volatilities at time t + k, for k = −5,−4,...,4,5. The
top panel shows the results for the whole sample. The middle panel and the bottom
panel display the results for the subset of ﬁrms with one or more Type A releases and
with one or more Type L releases, respectively. In each panel, the cross-correlations
for individual ﬁrms are averaged across ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd, on average across all ﬁrms, a positive correlation between percentage
changes in credit spreads and both present and past percentage changes in IV. The
top panel in Fig. 7 documents a ﬂow of information from the options market to the
CDS market. As implied volatilities increase, contemporaneous and future prices of
default protection decrease. When the whole sample is employed, the cross-correlation
between relative CDS changes and future relative IV changes is still positive and
signiﬁcant for day t + 1, even though it is substantially smaller in magnitude. The
correlation structure for the subset of ﬁrms with Type A announcements is similar
to that for the whole sample, except that the cross-correlation between CDS returns
at time t and IV returns at time t + 1 is now almost 2.5 times as large as the
corresponding value for the sample average. In other words, the middle panel in
Fig. 7 shows that ﬁrms that were involved in accounting irregularities or fraud during
our sample period show on average a larger ﬂow of information from current CDS
returns to IV returns one day later. For the subset of ﬁrms with LBO announcements
in the bottom panel of the same plot, the positive relationship between percentage
18changes in credit spreads and percentage changes in implied volatilities disappears,
except when comparing CDS returns at time t to IV returns on date t − 2. In any
case, none of the estimates in the bottom panel are signiﬁcant, a fact that is partially
due to the fairly small number of ﬁrms (10) in our sample for which news of Type L
were released.
Fig. 8 presents the correlation structure between daily percentage changes in CDS
rates and daily stock returns. The results in the top panel show a negative average
correlation between percentage changes in credit spreads and both present and past
stock returns. This points to a ﬂow of information from the equity market to the
CDS market. As stock returns increase, contemporaneous and future prices for de-
fault protection decrease. When the whole sample is employed, the cross-correlation
between relative CDS changes and future stock returns is essentially zero, which is
in line with the ﬁndings in Acharya and Johnson (2007a). The panel for ﬁrms with
Type A announcements, on the other hand, shows a small negative ﬂow of information
from the CDS market to the stock market. The correlation is greatest in magnitude,
and statistically signiﬁcant, for day t + 1. The bottom panel of Fig. 8 is in striking
contrast to both the top and the middle panel. For ﬁrms with a Type L announce-
ment, the cross-correlation between percentage changes in CDS rates and past stock
returns is substantially smaller in absolute values when compared to the top two pan-
els, indicating that there is little to no ﬂow of information from the equity market to
the credit market. More importantly, the correlation between contemporaneous CDS
and stock returns is now positive (and statistically signiﬁcant). This ﬁnding diﬀers
dramatically from the results for the whole sample and for ﬁrms with Type A an-
nouncements. It is consistent with the notion that leveraged buyout announcements
or rumors of a possible LBO deal often lead to higher leverage and hence higher credit
spreads for the target ﬁrm, but are at the same time good news for its equity holders.
We also ﬁnd a small but positive ﬂow of information from CDS returns to future
stock returns (signiﬁcant at 10% level for time t+1). This evidence is in line with the
hypothesis that insiders in CDS markets exploit information regarding future LBO
19announcements.
Finally, Fig. 9 plots the cross-correlation between daily percentage changes in IV
and daily stock returns. In all three panels, there is a negative correlation between
percentage changes in implied volatilities and present stock returns. When using all
ﬁrms in our sample, that correlation is estimated to be -0.3. For ﬁrms with Type A
announcements, the correlation between contemporaneous percentage changes in IV
and stock returns is slightly larger in magnitude than for the whole sample, while
for ﬁrms with Type L announcements it is substantially smaller in magnitude. A
potential explanation for the latter ﬁnding is that the unconditional negative rela-
tionship between IV returns at time t and stock returns at t is reversed when LBO
announcements are made. When the whole sample is used, the correlation between
IV returns and future stock returns is essentially zero. (The average of the correlation
estimates for IV returns at time t and stock returns at time t+k, across k = 1,...,5,
is less than one percent.) When focusing on the ﬁrst lag only, that is the correlation
between IV returns at time t and stock returns at time t+ 1, that value is estimated
to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. From the middle and the bottom panel of
Fig. 9 we ﬁnd that this correlation is estimated to be larger in magnitude for ﬁrms
with Type A announcements, and that it is essentially zero for ﬁrms with Type L
announcements.
In summary, this preliminary evidence suggests that the information ﬂow between
credit and options markets can be signiﬁcant in both directions, and that strength of
the spillover eﬀects in either direction is closely linked to the kind of news released for
the ﬁrm. More importantly, signiﬁcant cross-correlation between CDS returns and
future stock returns may exist for ﬁrms that were subject to certain kind of news, and
the sign of that relationship can be negative for ﬁrms with value-deteriorating news
(e.g., Type A announcements) and positive for ﬁrms with debt-deteriorating news
(e.g., Type L announcements). The magnitude of the correlation between percentage
changes in implied volatilities and future stock returns also depends on the type of
news a ﬁrm has been subject to, but it is generally smaller in absolute terms than
20the corresponding value for CDS returns and future stock returns.
4. Information Flow between CDS and Options
Markets
In this section, we investigate the information ﬂow between CDS and options markets.
We pay particular attention to the conditional spillover eﬀects around a number of
credit- and options-market events and around speciﬁc news releases.
4.1. Information Flow from CDS to Options Markets
First, we analyze the information content of credit spreads for future movements


































o are the innovations in the CDS market relative to the options
market as deﬁned in Section 2.2.1. We examine b and bz, z ∈ {pre,at,post}, as
measures of unconditional and conditional information ﬂows from the CDS market
to the options market. Results are provided in the ﬁrst column of the top panel
of Table 3. Our ﬁndings indicate that the unconditional ﬂow of information from
the CDS market to the options market is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The
regression results predict that if CDS innovations increase by 10% during the previous
trading day, current percentage changes in implied volatilities increase by 0.49%. The
estimate for bpre in the ﬁrst column of the table indicates an average conditional
spillover from CDS innovations to future options market returns of 1.3% during the
three days leading up to a credit-market event. (Note that this estimate is not
21statistically diﬀerent from zero for our sample period.) However, on the day of the
adverse credit-market event and for the three days immediately following it, we ﬁnd a
negative conditional ﬂow of information of −3.4% and −2.7%, respectively, which is
statistically signiﬁcant for the latter case. This points to a signiﬁcantly smaller total
ﬂow of information from the CDS market to the options market in the days following
a dramatic increase in the ﬁrm’s credit spreads.
A feature of the panel regression in (6) is that it forces all ﬁrms to have the
same dynamic properties, except as captured by the conditioning introduced in the
lagged response terms. To study the cross-ﬁrm variation in the response to credit-
market news, we now allow the information ﬂow to vary depending on the ﬁrm’s (i)
distance to default, (ii) implied volatility, and (iii) size. The later is computed as
the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity by multiplying CRSP share prices by number
of shares outstanding. The size of ﬁrm i is denoted by SZi and reported in millions
of U.S. dollars. This analysis addresses the possibility that our previous ﬁndings
regarding the conditional spillover eﬀects from CDS innovations to options market
returns were actually driven by uncaptured variation in the other terms (the intercept








































































t is deﬁned in a similar fashion to ensure that any CDS innovations
22lag eﬀects are not artifacts of unmodeled dynamics in the option price itself. Results
are provided in the second column of the top panel of Table 3. Our ﬁndings indicate
that the unconditional information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options mar-
ket is still positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The regression results predict that if
CDS innovations increase by 10% during the previous trading day, current percent-
age changes in implied volatilities increase by 0.5%. There is a signiﬁcant positive
conditional spillover of 1.7% as the ﬁrm’s distance to default decreases (and default
probabilities increase) and of 3.7% as its log implied volatility increases. The size of
the ﬁrm does not alter the ﬂow of information in a signiﬁcant way. On the day of an
adverse credit-market event as well as for the three days immediately preceding and
for the three days immediately following the event, we ﬁnd a negative conditional
spillover eﬀect that is statistically signiﬁcant for the latter case. While adding the
three control variables leaves the estimate for ˆ b nearly unchanged, the estimates for
the conditional CDSinnovo multipliers are now more negative.
Finally, we also account for sectoral and temporal eﬀects to capture variations in
the information ﬂow that is common to all ﬁrms but not yet captured by distance to












to the right-hand side of (8). Here, bs and bq denote the dummy multiplier for sector
s and quarter q, respectively. The ﬁrst quarter of 2002 and Basic Materials are the
reference quarter and sector, respectively. Results are provided in the third column
of the top panel of Table 3. For ﬁrms in our benchmark sector, the average quarterly
unconditional information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options market is 4.1%,
which is in line with the values reported for the earlier model speciﬁcations. This
estimate is, at least on average, no longer statistically signiﬁcant due to the reduced
amount of data per quarterly dummy multiplier to be estimated. The estimates for
the sectoral dummy variable multipliers (not reported) indicate that ﬁrms in the Con-
23sumer Goods (+4.1%), Telecommunications (+5.6%), and Utilities (+6.1%) sectors
exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher ﬂow of information. Even after controlling for sectoral
and temporal eﬀects, there still is a signiﬁcant positive conditional spillover of 1.4% as
the ﬁrm’s distance to default decreases and 5.5% as log implied volatilities increase.
As before, the size of the ﬁrm shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Similarly, when an adverse
credit-market event occurs as well as for the three days immediately preceding and
for the three days immediately following the event, we still ﬁnd a negative conditional
spillover eﬀect that is statistically signiﬁcant for the latter case. This leads to a di-
minished total ﬂow of information from CDS innovations to options market returns
around dramatic increases in the ﬁrm’s CDS rates.
The remaining columns in the top panel of Table 3 show the estimation results





∆VlmP, respectively. Ignoring for a moment estimates for the options-market-event
dummy multipliers, the ﬁndings with regard to the unconditional and conditional
information ﬂow remain roughly the same. The only diﬀerence is that now we observe
a signiﬁcant positive conditional spillover eﬀect for large ﬁrms. What is of interest is
that at the time of and for the three days immediately following dramatic increases
in implied volatilities we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant incremental ﬂow of information from the
CDS market to the options market of 44.4% and 2.9%, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 4, upward jumps in implied volatilities coincide with adverse
credit market events for less than ten percent of the latter events. That ﬁgure is
even lower when comparing the timing of upward jumps in call-option volume or in
put-option volume to that of upward jumps in credit spreads. To improve the inter-
pretability of our estimates for the event-condition dummy multipliers, we therefore
now replace the credit-market event dummy D
z,i
∆CDS with dummy variables that iden-





































The top panel of Table 4 reports the parameter estimates and t-statistics for each
announcement type anmt ∈ {A,E,S,B}. The results for Type L announcements are
shown in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 7. We again run the three nested panel
regressions
I: ai = a, bi




t are speciﬁed as in (8), and
III: bi
t and ci
t are given as in (8) plus (9).
Results for the unconditional ﬂow of information and for spillover eﬀects conditioned
on distance to default and on implied volatility are similar to those presented in Ta-
ble 3. For speciﬁcation III, we estimate the conditional ﬂow of information from CDS
innovations to options market returns for large ﬁrms to be positive and signiﬁcant.
(The estimates for Type E and Type L announcements are signiﬁcant only at the
10% level.) When using speciﬁc types of news instead of dramatic upward jumps in
credit spreads to pin down when adverse credit-market events occur we are able to
establish a strong positive conditional ﬂow of information from the CDS market to
the options market on the day negative earnings announcements are made. Expand-
ing the window to the week around a Type E news release, we still ﬁnd a positive
average incremental spillover eﬀect of (3bpre + bat + 3bpost)/7 equal to 2.5% for the
full model (speciﬁcation III). Another interesting observation can be made for Type
L news. The estimates in Table 7 point to a positive and signiﬁcant conditional ﬂow
of information from CDSinnovo to future IVrtn during the three-day period prior to
a LBO announcement. This incremental ﬂow of information is reversed, however,
25on the day of the announcement and during the three-day period following the news
release.
4.2. Information Flow from the Options Market to the CDS Market
To investigate the reverse ﬂow of information from the options market to the CDS
market, we regress daily CDS returns on innovations in implied volatilities using
diﬀerent credit- and options-market condition dummies. In a panel-data regression




































for the three nested speciﬁcations I, II, and III of ai, bi
t and ci
t described above.
Results are provided in the bottom panel of Table 3. After isolating innovations in
individual implied volatilities, we ﬁnd that the unconditional ﬂow to the CDS market
is positive at a transmission rate of more than 3% for the full model. Our estimates
for the sector dummy multipliers (not reported) indicate that only Industrial ﬁrms
have a signiﬁcantly higher transmission rate (+2.4%). Even after controlling for
sectoral and temporal eﬀects, there is still a signiﬁcant positive conditional spillover
eﬀect from IVinnovc to future CDS returns for ﬁrms with high implied volatilities
(+7.6%). In contrast to the results in Section 4.2, the incremental spillover eﬀect
from options to CDS markets seems to be larger for smaller companies and for ﬁrms
with higher credit ratings. For example, if a ﬁrm’s distance to default increases from
1.88 (the sample average across all ﬁrms and time) to 2.88, and hence Merton (1974)
one-year default probabilities decrease from 0.03 to 0.002, the ﬂow of information
from options to credit markets increases by 0.3 percent. Similarly, when the log
size of the ﬁrm increases from 9.33 (the sample average across all ﬁrms and time)
to 10.33, the spillover eﬀect decreases by -0.3 percent. Both the distance-to-default
26and ﬁrm-size coeﬃcient estimates are signiﬁcant for model speciﬁcation II. Although
the economic impact of these two condition variables remains the same, they are no
longer statistically signiﬁcant for the full model, a fact that is partially due to the
reduced amount of data per variables to be estimated for speciﬁcation III.
For the seven-day period around a dramatic upward jump in a ﬁrm’s implied
volatility, the conditional spillover eﬀect from past IVinnovc to present CDSrtn is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant with an average daily incremental transmission
rate of (3bpre + bat + 3bpost)/7 equal to 1.7% for the full model. It is of particular
interest that during the three days prior to such an option-market event, percentage
changes in credit spreads absorb on average an additional 2.3% of the IV innovations
of the previous trading day, even after controlling for the ﬁrm’s size, credit quality,
idiosyncratic volatility and sector, as well as for other temporal eﬀects. This estimate
is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
The remaining columns in the bottom panel of Table 3 show the estimation results





∆VlmP, respectively. Except for the event dummy multipliers, the ﬁndings with
regard to the unconditional and conditional information ﬂow remain roughly the
same. In addition, we detect an incremental ﬂow of information from the options
market to the CDS market of about 1.6% per day during the three days prior to
large jumps in credit spreads (column three), and a signiﬁcant conditional spillover of
2.3% for the three days prior to a dramatic increase in put-options volume (column
twelve). In that sense, we detect a signiﬁcant incremental ﬂow of information from the
options market to the credit market a few days prior to adverse news being revealed
in derivatives markets.
As in Section 4.1, we proceed to investigate the information revelation from the
options market to the credit market around ﬁrm-speciﬁc news releases by replacing
D
z,i
∆IV(t) in (11) with D
z,i
anmt(t) for anmt ∈ {A,E,S,B,L}. Results for the uncondi-
tional ﬂow of information and for spillover eﬀects conditioned on distance to default,
implied volatility and ﬁrm size are reported in the bottom panel of Table 4 for Type
27A, E, S and B news, and in columns 4 through 6 of Table 7 for LBO announcements.
They are similar to those presented in the bottom panel of Table 3.
With regard to the announcement dummy multipliers, the parameter estimates
shown in Tables 4 and 7 identify strong incremental eﬀects for announcements of
Type A (before and at news release), Type S (before announcement) and Type L
(before announcement). For announcements of Type S and L, an initial positive
conditional spillover is partially reversed when and just after the news is released. The
results for news relating to accounting irregularities or fraudulent behavior (Type A
announcements) are of particular interest. They indicate that the average conditional
ﬂow of information from options markets to credit markets during the period that
starts three days prior to the announcement and ends three days after the news is
released, (3bpre + bat + 3bpost)/7, amounts to 14.7%. For the median sector in our
sample, that is more than six times the size of the unconditional ﬂow of information
from options to CDS markets.
In summary, we ﬁnd that (i) investors absorb information revealed in the CDS
market into prices of equity options within a few days and vice versa, (ii) the in-
cremental conditional information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options market
is signiﬁcant for high-yield and for highly volatile ﬁrms, but is reduced in the days
following a dramatic increase in credit spreads, and (iii) there is a strong condi-
tional spillover from the options market to the CDS market during the week around
a dramatic increase in implied volatility, as well as for highly volatile ﬁrms.
Running the horse race between the credit market and the options market shows
that in general there is no clear winner: At least at the daily level, the options mar-
ket seems to reveal information at the same time as the credit market. In particular,
we ﬁnd only limited support for the hypothesis that credit spreads contain informa-
tion about adverse ﬁrm-speciﬁc developments before that information is reﬂected in
options prices, with the exception of times when negative earnings announcements
are made. If anything, the options market sometimes seems to react in advance of
the credit market, especially during the days leading up to dramatic increases in im-
28plied volatilities or in put-options volume, and before accounting scandals break or
fraudulent behavior is detected.
4.3. Robustness Checks
To check whether the leading relation identiﬁed in Section 4.2 is merely a transient
eﬀect, possibly due to some short-term price pressure from the hedging activity of
options-market participants in the credit market, we experiment with more than one















o(t − k). (12)
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant contribution to the unconditional or the conditional ﬂow of
information at any lag other than the ﬁrst one. (Results not reported.) As an




∆IV with dummy variables
that were turned on for more than three days—for example, for ﬁve or seven days.
Again, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant deviation from the results reported previously.
Yet another speciﬁcation would be to leave D
post,i
∆IV turned on throughout the re-
mainder of the sample period. We decided not to use such a speciﬁcation because
it would make it diﬃcult to disentangle the unconditional information ﬂow from
that around event dates, particularly because many instances of dramatic one-day
increases in implied volatilities occur early in the sample (for example, in the second
half of 2002 following the Worldcom disaster). In addition, the current deﬁnition of
the volatility-condition dummy variables allows for a more natural interpretation of
the eﬀects of more than one upward jump in volatility for the ﬁrm during our sample
period. Similar robustness checks were performed for the results in Section 4.1. Reas-
sured by the outcome of these tests, we interpret (3bpre+bat+3bpost)/7 as a measure of
permanent information ﬂow conditioned on adverse credit-market or options-market
events.
295. Information Flow from CDS and Options Mar-
kets to the Equity Market
In this section, we quantify the joint contribution of the CDS market and the options
market to price discovery relative to the stock market. Our panel-data regression



















































where cond ∈ {∆CDS,∆IV,∆VlmC,∆VlmP}. Whereas IV innovations are mea-
sured relative to the equity market only (news in the options market that has not
yet been revealed in the equity market), CDS innovations are deﬁned relative to both
the stock market and the options market (news in the CDS market that has not yet
been revealed in either the equity market or the options market). Using CDSinnove,o
instead of CDSinnove in (13) enables us to measure the CDS market’s contribution
to price discovery relative to both the stock market and the options market.
The recognition of two types of announcements—news that widens credit spreads
can be either value deteriorating (bad news for both equity and debt holders) or
debt deteriorating (bad news for debt holders but good news for equity holders)—is
advantageous not just in detecting a conditional ﬂow of information from the CDS
and the options markets to the equity market, but also in measuring the sign and
magnitude of such incremental spillover eﬀects correctly. We therefore replace the
credit- and options-market event dummies with dummy variables that identify the
type of announcement. In particular, we re-estimate the panel regression in (13) after
replacing D•
cond with D•
anmt, for anmt ∈ {A,E,S,B,L}.
30Tables 5, 6 and 7 report the estimation results for three nested model speciﬁca-
tions:
I: ai = a, bi
t = b, di









t are given as in (8) plus (9).
Focusing on the full model (speciﬁcation III), we now describe our ﬁndings for the
CDS innovation and for the IV innovation dummy multipliers in (13).
5.1. Information Flow from the CDS Market to the Equity Market, After Controlling
for the Information Content of Option Prices
We ﬁrst discuss the estimation results for the information ﬂow from CDSinnove,o
to future STKrtn, after controlling for news revealed in the options market. Table 5
shows that for ﬁrms in our benchmark sector (Basic Materials), the unconditional
ﬂow of information from the credit market to the equity market is very small: on
the order of −0.1% to −0.7%, depending on the conditioning variable. It is signif-
icantly more negative (−1.7% to −2.8%) only for Utilities ﬁrms. The incremental
spillover eﬀect from CDS to equity markets is more negative for high-IV and for large
ﬁrms and increases in absolute value with the company’s default risk, although the
latter estimate loses its statistical signiﬁcance when taking into account sectoral and
quarterly eﬀects.
This evidence suggests that under certain market conditions, price discovery in
the credit markets precedes that in the equity market. Acharya and Johnson (2007a)
suggest that this is likely due to the activity of insiders with access to non-public
information and support their hypothesis by providing evidence that more insiders
lead to a greater information ﬂow from the CDS market to the equity market. The
authors use the number of banking relationships for the ﬁrm—the number of commer-
cial banks with an ongoing lending relationship with the company—as a proxy for the
number of insiders. Since the data on banking relationships is not available to us, we
31make use of the fact that there is a strong monotonic relationship between the number
of banking relationships and the size of the ﬁrm, also shown by Acharya and Johnson
(2007a). In the sense that the ﬁrm-size dummy multiplier for CDSinnove,o in (13) is
estimated to be signiﬁcant and negative, our results in Table 5 support the hypoth-
esis that the information ﬂow from CDS markets to equity markets is stronger as
the number of insiders increases. The contribution over the existing literature is that
we have veriﬁed that this statement holds even after controlling for the information
content of option prices.
The results in Table 5 indicate an additional negative ﬂow of information from
the CDS market to the equity market during the seven-day period around a dramatic
increase in credit spreads. Average daily transmission rates become more negative by
(3bpre+bat+3bpost)/7 = −0.6%. With regard to upward jumps in implied volatilities,
call-option and put-option volume, the incremental spillover eﬀect from CDSinnove,o
to future STKrtn amounts to −2.5%, −1.4% and 0.5% respectively. Note that for
the average ﬁrm in our sample, the unconditional and conditional ﬂow of information
from the CDS market to the equity market is estimated to be negative, implying that
adverse ﬁrm-speciﬁc news revealed in credit markets tend to reduce future returns on
the ﬁrm’s equity.
Next, we replace the credit- and options-market event dummies in (13) with
dummy variables that pin down the timing of actual ﬁrm-speciﬁc news releases, which
allows us to investigate to what extent the incremental information revelation from
the CDS market to the equity market depends on the type of announcement. Results
are summarized in Table 6 for announcement types A, E, S and B, and in Table 7
for Type L news. Except for the event dummy multipliers, the ﬁndings with regard
to the unconditional and conditional information revelation are roughly as presented
in Table 5. Fig. 10 shows the estimates for the quarterly dummy multipliers for
innovations in CDS rates. Any common time variation in the spillover eﬀects that
cannot be accounted for by changes in credit quality, implied volatility or ﬁrm size
is captured by this time series. What we ﬁnd is that transmission rates from credit
32to equity markets are substantially more negative in the second half of our sample
period (since 2004).
Even after controlling for the information contained in option prices, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant conditional spillover from the CDS market to the equity market when an-
nouncements of Type A or E are made, for the three-day period leading up to a Type
S or Type L announcement, and for the three-day period following a news release of
Type B. The results for lower-than-expected earnings or lowered earnings forecasts
(Type E announcements) are particularly interesting. They show that the average
conditional ﬂow of information from CDS to equity markets during the period that
starts three days prior to the announcement and ends three days after the news is re-
leased, (3bpre+bat+3bpost)/7, amounts to −3.7%. For the average sector in our sample,
that is almost six times the size of the unconditional ﬂow of information from CDS to
equity markets. Together with the evidence presented in Section 4.1, our ﬁndings sug-
gest that CDS markets discover information regarding lower-than-expected earnings
or earnings forecasts to be lowered before that information is revealed through option
or equity prices, and at least one day or even a few days before the news is publicly
released. At the time a Type E announcement is made and for the three-day period
thereafter, we ﬁnd both a strong positive incremental spillover from credit to options
markets and a strong negative incremental spillover from CDS to equity markets.
Another striking ﬁnding is the positive sign for the incremental ﬂow of informa-
tion from credit to equity markets around the time when leveraged buyout deals
are announced. The positive sign is in line with our intuition that LBOs are debt-
deteriorating news, meaning good news for equity holders and bad news for creditors
of the buyout target. The average conditional ﬂow of information from CDS to equity
markets during the week around the news release equals +5.2%. For the three-day
period leading up to a Type L announcement, the incremental rate of transmission is
signiﬁcant and amounts to +10.0%. For the average ﬁrm in our sample, this implies
that the total ﬂow of information from CDSinnove,o to future STKrtn is positive
during that time.
33During the seven-day window around a Type S announcement date, the average
conditional ﬂow of information from the credit market to the equity market is roughly
4.6 times the size of the unconditional ﬂow for the average sector. In comparison, that
ﬁgure amounts to 2.8 and −4.1 for Type B and Type A announcements, respectively.
The negative sign for the latter is due to the fact that for the three-day period leading
up to a Type A news release, the conditional information ﬂow from credit to equity
markets is positive. The direction of that conditional spillover changes, however, on
the day of a Type A announcement, and it remains negative for the three-day period
following the news release.
To summarize our ﬁndings so far: even after controlling for news revealed through
options prices, the CDS market leads the equity market at times when certain adverse
credit-market events occur, for example when news of lower-than-expected earnings
is revealed or when leveraged buyout announcements are made. Using event dummies
for speciﬁc types of news instead of credit or options-market condition dummies allows
us to distinguish a leading relationship with a negative incremental spillover eﬀect (as
observed for value-deteriorating news of Type E) from that with a positive conditional
ﬂow of information (e.g., for debt-deteriorating news of Type L).
Finally, we investigate to what extent the estimation results in Tables 7, 5 and 6
change if we do not account for news revealed in the options market. Speciﬁcally, we




































where • ∈ {∆CDS,∆IV,∆VlmC,∆VlmP,A,E,S,B,L}. Note that in this case, CDS
innovations are deﬁned relative to the stock market only (news in the CDS market
that has not yet been revealed in the equity market).
Ignoring for a moment estimates for the event dummy multipliers, we ﬁnd that
34the (unreported) results for (14) are similar to those for (13). But on days with
dramatic upward jumps in credit spreads, the conditional spillover from the CDS
market to the equity market is estimated to be more than 40% higher in absolute
values when ignoring the options market, decreasing from −0.032 for (13) to −0.045
for (14). As a results, the average daily conditional ﬂow of information from CDS to
equity markets during the seven-day window around an upward jump in CDS almost
doubles from −0.6% to −1.0%. Similar observations can be made for Type E and
Type L announcements. For Type E news, the average conditional ﬂow is now also
more negative, decreasing from −3.7% for (13) to −4.2% for (14). Moreover, when
options-market news are not taken into account, all three Type E announcement
dummy multipliers bpre, bat and bpost (instead of just bat) are estimated to be statis-
tically signiﬁcant. For days when Type L announcements are made, the estimated
incremental transmission rate changes from 0.038 for (13) to 0.115 if the options
market is ignored, an increase of more than 200%.
In conclusion, while many of the results regarding unconditional and conditional
ﬂows of information from credit to equity markets that are obtained for (14) still
remain valid when controlling for option-market news as in (13), the estimated ab-
solute value of incremental spillover eﬀects around adverse credit-market events is
likely to have an upward bias under the former speciﬁcation. This result supports
the hypothesis that the CDS market provides information to equity investors about
adverse credit-market events in addition to or more precisely than what the options
market reveals.
5.2. Information Flow from the Options Market to the Equity Market
We now turn our attention to the information ﬂow from IVinnove to future stock
returns. Even though CDSinnov
i




i (see Section 2.2.1 for deﬁnitions), in (13) some
interaction between these three terms may arise through their joint interaction with
D
z,i
cond. However, we have veriﬁed that the results regarding information revelation
from options to equity markets derived from the joint model in (13) do not change
35in any signiﬁcant way if credit markets were ignored. This allows us to focus our
discussion of results on the former.
Table 5 shows that the unconditional information revelation from the options
market to the equity market is also very small: on the order of −0.1% to −0.4%
for the benchmark sector, depending on the conditioning variable. It is signiﬁcantly
more negative only for Oil and Gas ﬁrms (−1.8% to −2.1%). The conditional spillover
eﬀects from options to equity markets are stronger for highly volatile ﬁrms. In contrast
to the results for credit markets, the conditional ﬂow of information from the options
market to the equity market is signiﬁcantly more pronounced for smaller ﬁrms. In
other words, an increase in IV innovations has a larger impact on stock returns of a
small ﬁrm than on those of larger companies. The riskiness of the ﬁrm, as measured
by its distance to default, has only a small, insigniﬁcant impact.
The results in Table 5 show no additional ﬂow of information from the options
market to the equity market during the week around an upward jump in implied
volatility. Average daily transmission rates are essentially zero (−0.1%). With regard
to upward jumps in call-option volume, put-option volume and credit spreads, the
incremental spillover eﬀect from IVinnove to future STKrtn amounts to −1.4%, 0.2%
and −1.5% respectively.
A better interpretation of the sign and the magnitude of the conditional infor-
mation ﬂow around adverse credit or options-market events can be obtained when
the conditioning dummies in (13) are replaced by dummy variables for speciﬁc types
of news. The results in Tables 6 and 7 show that the ﬁndings with regard to the
unconditional and conditional information revelation—except for the event dummy
multipliers—are roughly the same as in Table 5.
It is important to point out that there are no signiﬁcant negative conditional
spillover eﬀects from the options market to the equity market around announcement
dates for Type A, E, S or B news, at least not for the full model (speciﬁcation III). Al-
though we detect a signiﬁcant positive incremental transmission of information when
announcements of Type S are made, the incremental information ﬂow has the oppo-
36site sign during the three-day period preceding and the three-day period following the
disclosure. This results in a small but negative average conditional ﬂow of informa-
tion from options to equity markets of −0.5% during the week around a Type S news
release date. Despite the strong evidence presented in Section 4.2 that the options
market discovers information regarding accounting scandals or fraudulent behavior
(Type A announcements) before that news is revealed through default swap rates,
the results in Table 6 suggest that this information has to manifest itself in the CDS
market before it is fully appreciated by the equity market.
As in Section 4.2, we do ﬁnd a positive sign for the incremental ﬂow of infor-
mation from options to equity markets when LBO announcements are made. The
average conditional spillover during the week around the news release amounts to
an impressive +7.7%. On the date the Type L news breaks, the incremental rate of
transmission is signiﬁcant and particularly large at +47.5%, reversing the sign of the
total ﬂow of information from yesterday’s IVinnove to today’s STKrtn from negative
to positive for the average ﬁrm in our sample.
5.3. Summary of Results
Our empirical evidence shows that
(a) there is a positive unconditional ﬂow of information from the CDS market to
the options markets and vice versa.
(b) at the daily level, the options market often reveals information at the same time
as the credit market does (e.g., for Type B and Type L news). For announce-
ments of Type A or S, option prices even react in advance of credit spreads.
An exception are Type E news, for which the CDS market leads the options
market.
(c) the unconditional ﬂow of information from the credit market to the equity
market is negative but very small. The same holds true for the information ﬂow
from the options market.
37(d) there is a strong conditional spillover from CDS to equity markets for announce-
ments of Type E, S and L, even after controlling for the news revealed in options
prices.
(e) except for Type L news, we do not detect any incremental spillover eﬀects from
options to equity markets for the other four types of announcements. And even
for LBO announcements, the equity market ﬁrst reacts to news in credit spreads
and only afterwards to movement in options prices.
For all ﬁve types of announcements that we analyze we ﬁnd that the equity mar-
ket does not respond to news in option prices unless that information has manifested
itself in the CDS market. A potential explanation is that options are more likely to
trade on unsubstantiated rumors than default swaps are, setting oﬀ so-called “piggy-
back” buying from options traders hoping to catch a lucky break. Berman and Ng
(2006) argue that in many of these instances, such as for Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide Inc., the trading stir ends in a whimper and no deal ever materializes. As
a result, if there is a sudden upward jump in implied volatility that is not accom-
panied by a reaction in credit spreads that day or shortly afterwards, equity-market
participants may be more likely to believe that the change in option prices was due to
unsubstantiated rumors rather than new information. In the next section, we build on
this concept and develop a simple framework of information arrival and transmission
that is rich enough to generate the stylized facts described in (a) through (e).
6. A Simple Model of Information Arrival and Trans-
mission
To improve the interpretability of our empirical results, we propose a model of in-
formation arrival and transmission for credit, options and equity markets that is,
although very simply, rich enough to capture the essence of the empirical ﬁndings
summarized in Section 5.3. For a given ﬁrm, let DE
t denote a dummy variable that
38equals one if news of an event that is bad for the ﬁrm’s creditors is released at t, and
zero otherwise. Similarly, let DR
t denote a dummy variable that equals one if unsub-
stantiated rumors—that are not indicative of any real event—are spread at time t.
To keep things simple we assume that DE
t and DR
t are independent of each other,
and of all information available up to day t − 1. Suppose that new information is
incorporated into credit spreads according to
CDSrtnt = κ
c + κ
c,c CDSrtnt−1 + κ
c,oIVrtnt−1 + κ




















t’s are zero-mean random variables with constant standard deviation σc,
independent of DE
t , DR
t and all information available up to t − 1. In addition to
relating to past CDS, options and stock returns, CDS rates jump upward at time t if
adverse credit-market news is announced on that day, or if such news will be released
publicly within the next two days. The latter is allowing for the fact that credit
market participants may have access to insider information at time t about adverse





response of the credit market to current news and to insider information.
Percentage changes in implied volatilities are assumed to follow a similar pattern,
with the additional possibility of trading on rumors. One day after an unsubstantiated
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One could easily extend the set-up in (15) and (16) to the case where the constant
dummy multiplier κ
c,E
1 is multiplied with a zero-one random variable that captures
whether or not credit spreads move at time t given insider information regarding
news to be revealed publicly the next day. Similarly for the non-negative scalars κc,E,
39κ
c,E




2 and κo,R. In addition, credit markets may also trade on rumors,
although possibly to a lesser extent than options markets.
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t are correlated with correlation parameters ρc,o, ρc,e and ρo,e. Ct
is a dummy variable that equals one at time t if credit spreads exhibited a dramatic
upward jump the previous day even though no announcements were made either
yesterday or today. In other words, Ct = 1 if CDSrtnt−1 − (κc + κc,cCDSrtnt−2 +
κc,oIVrtnt−2 + κc,e STKrtnt−2 + εc
t−1) > 0 and DE
t−1 = DE
t = 0. If equity-market
participants cannot observe past values of εc, or if κc, κc,c, κc,o or κc,e are un-
known, the outcome of Ct can still be approximated by assuming εc
t−1 = 0 and
by using the past history of asset returns to compute OLS estimates for the un-
known parameters. Similarly, ¯ Ct is a dummy variable that equals one if implied
volatilities exhibited a dramatic upward jump at t − 1 even though credit spreads
did not jump upwards and no news was released yesterday, that is, ¯ Ct = 1 if
IVrtnt−1−(κo+κo,cCDSrtnt−2+κo,oIVrtnt−2+κo,e STKrtnt−2+εo
t−1) > 0, CDSrtnt−1−
(κc+κc,c CDSrtnt−2+κc,o IVrtnt−2+κc,e STKrtnt−2+εc
t−1) = 0 and DE
t−1 = 0. The sign
of κe,E determines whether the adverse news identiﬁed by DE
t is value-deteriorating
(κe,E < 0) or debt-deteriorating (κe,E > 0).
The speciﬁcation of stock returns in (17) captures the notion that investors in
equity markets are strongly adverse to trading on rumors. Prices will adopt to new
information only when it is publicly announced (that is, DE
t = 1) or when strong
upward jumps in credit spreads have occurred the previous day even though no news
was released at that time (Ct = 1). The latter is interpreted by stock-market par-
ticipants as a signal of insider activity in credit markets, and we assume that equity
40markets react to that information with a one-day delay by adjusting stock returns by
γκe,E the next day. In our implementation, we use γ = κ
c,E





account for the relative strength of the CDS-market signal. In contrast, if dramatic
upward jumps in IV occur without contemporaneous news announcements or upward
jumps in credit spreads, we assume that equity investors act very conservatively: they
assume that these jumps were due to rumors rather than to options markets revealing
new information prior to a public announcement and before CDS markets do. Equity
investors are not in a position to directly verify at time t, whether or not the abnormal
options-market trading on the previous day was caused by unsubstantiated rumors.
They revise their beliefs regarding an options-market signal only after observing a





2 = 0, there is no insider activity in credit markets, and that the





In what follows we perform a simulation study of the model framework proposed
in (15) through (17). Table 8 lists the set of model speciﬁcations for which we run a
Monte Carlo analysis. Speciﬁcations M1 through M9 establish benchmark scenarios
for the arrival and ﬂow of information for the three markets, and M10 through M12
are designed to mimic the empirical ﬁndings for speciﬁc announcement types.
Given parameter values, we ﬁrst simulate the time series of announcement dates,
DE
t , assuming that adverse credit-market news arrive at the jump times of a Poisson
process with parameter lE. We employ the compensator method described in Duﬃe
and Singleton (2003) to simulate the event times. Similarly to DE
t , we simulate the
time series of DR
t according to the jumps times of an independent Poisson process
with parameter lR. In a second step, we jointly simulate the time series of CDS, op-
tions and stock returns. Using the simulated return series, we then compute CDS and
IV innovations. (For the purpose of this simulation study, we simplify the deﬁnition
innovations introduced in Section 2.2.1 to include only one lag and by ignoring the in-
teraction with DDt). Finally, we perform three sets of regressions: (6), speciﬁcation I
of (11), and speciﬁcation I of (13). Our focus is on the information ﬂow from CDS and













Results are reported in Table 9. Even though the framework in (15) through (17)
is undoubtedly only a simpliﬁed version of reality, it is nevertheless rich enough to
generate many of the empirical facts summarized in Section 5.3. All twelve model
speciﬁcations exhibit a positive unconditional ﬂow of information from CDS to options
markets and vice versa. There is no signiﬁcant unconditional information revelation
from CDS to equity markets (after accounting for the news revealed in options prices),
but a somewhat more signiﬁcant, although still very small, ﬂow of information from
options to equity markets. These ﬁndings are in line with the corresponding results
in Tables 3 through 7 (speciﬁcation I).
In model speciﬁcations M1, M5 and M9, CDS and options markets receive news
regarding adverse credit-market events simultaneously. The corresponding three
columns in Table 9 reveal that this implies no conditional positive spillover eﬀects
between the two markets and either no conditional negative spillovers from either
derivatives market to the equity market (M1), strong negative incremental trans-
mission rates from both derivatives markets to the equity market on the day of the
announcement (M5), or strong negative incremental transmission rates from both
derivatives markets to the equity market one day before the announcement (M9).
Speciﬁcations M2 and M6 show results were the options market trades on news
regarding a future announcement one day before the CDS market does, whereas M4
and M8 capture scenarios where the CDS market leads the options market by a
day. The results in Table 9 show that for M2 there is a strong conditional spillover
from the options market to both the credit and the equity market on the day of the
announcement, whereas for M6 the incremental ﬂow of information from options to
CDS markets occurs one day prior to the announcement, and then the equity market
learns from the CDS market (and not the options market) at the time the news is
released. For models M4 and M8, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant conditional transmission of
information from the CDS market on the day of the announcement (M4) or one day
42prior to it (M8). In speciﬁcation M3, the options market leads the CDS market by
two days, and vice versa for M7. For the former scenario, the simulation results
show no positive (negative) incremental ﬂow of information from options to CDS
(equity) markets in response to the options-market news. We also don’t ﬁnd any
positive conditional ﬂow from credit to options markets in M7, although we do detect
a strong and signiﬁcant spillover to equity markets prior to the announcement.
The simulation results for our benchmark models M1 through M9 display a wide
range of possible lead-lag relationships between credit, options and equity markets. In
particular, we ﬁnd that the information ﬂows around Type E announcements behave
similar in spirit to the predictions of model M4, where the CDS market trades on
insider information about news that is bad for the ﬁrm’s creditors one day prior it
being publicly announced. M1 and—to a lesser extent—M3 display a pattern similar
to that observed for Type B announcements, in that there are no signiﬁcant spillover
eﬀects from either the CDS or the options market to the equity market prior to or on
the day of the news disclosure.
The remaining three models M10, M11 and M12 were speciﬁed so as to capture, at
least in spirit, the information-ﬂow structure observed for Type A, Type S and Type
L announcements, respectively. For M10, information regarding adverse news arrives
ﬁrst in the options market, and only with a one-day delay in the CDS market. The
news is publicly announced two days after an upward jump in IV was ﬁrst observed.
To capture the positive conditional spillover eﬀect from options to CDS markets on
Type A announcement days, we allow both derivatives markets to adjust to the news
in two steps: with a large upward jump in returns that is followed by a second
smaller upward jump the next day. Similar considerations lead to speciﬁcation M11.
To mimic the results for news of Type S, the model needs to generate a positive
conditional spillover from options to CDS markets prior to the announcement (via
κ
o,E
2 > 0 and κ
c,E
1 > 0), as well as a negative conditional spillover from CDSinnove,o
to STKrtn also prior to the news release (via κ
c,E
2 > 0 and κe,E < 0).
Finally, M12 is designed to generate a set of results that is similar to our ﬁnd-
43ings for LBO announcements. Indeed, the model predicts strong positive conditional
spillover eﬀects from CDS to options markets and vice versa before the news is publicly
disclosed (via κ
c,E
2 > 0 and κ
o,E
2 > 0), a signiﬁcant positive conditional transmission
of information from CDS to equity markets one day before the news breaks, and a
signiﬁcant positive conditional spillover from options to equity markets at the time










7. Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, we substantiate our conjecture that the options market trades on
unsubstantiated rumors more often than does the default swap market. In particular,
we
• analyze the diﬀerences in participants in the two derivatives markets, and
• oﬀer empirical evidence that dramatic upward jumps in implied volatilities are
revised more frequently and sooner than are dramatic upward jumps in CDS.
We discuss these potential explanations in order.
CDS are typically traded in lots of $5 million notional, making them the exclu-
sive domain of large institutional investors. According to Mengle (2007), banks and
security ﬁrms (59%) and hedge funds (28%) accounted for 87% of the protection buy-
ers in the credit derivatives market in 2006, as a fraction of notional. Banks (44%),
hedge funds (32%) and insurance companies (17%) accounted for 93% of the protec-
tion sellers. The remaining activity stemmed from pension funds, mutual funds and
corporations.
The breakdown of credit-market participants is diﬀerent from that of options-
market participants, in that a signiﬁcant share of the latter market is held by small
investors. Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007) report that customers of
discount brokers, on average across time, stocks and types of contract, account for
4412% of the average daily open interest generated by non-market maker investors for
equity options listed at the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Customers
of full-service brokers account for 71%, with the remaining 17% of the open interest
generated by ﬁrm proprietary traders. Similarly, discount customers, full-service cus-
tomers and ﬁrm proprietary traders account for 10%, 75% and 15% of the average
daily trading volume, respectively. Discount brokers are geared toward smaller, do-it-
yourself investors. Clients of E-trade are an example of discount customers, whereas
clients of Merrill Lynch or Morgan Stanley would be categorized as full-service cus-
tomers. An example of a ﬁrm proprietary trader is an employee of an investment
bank who trades for the bank’s own account.
These statistics show that the options market has, in sharp contrast to the CDS
market, a non-negligible fraction of small investors. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
market share of banks trading on their own books is substantially smaller in the
options market than it is in the CDS market. The latter observation is especially
important in the context of Acharya and Johnson (2007a), who show that banks
that have lending or monitoring relations with a given ﬁrm often have nonpublic
advance information about negative credit news regarding that ﬁrm. Combined,
these observations lead us to the conclusion that the fraction of informed investors is
higher in the CDS market than it is in the options market, which is consistent with
our conjecture that the options market trades on unsubstantiated rumors more than
does the CDS market.
A second indication that options are more likely to trade on unsubstantiated
rumors is the fact that dramatic upward jumps in implied volatilities are revised
more frequently and signiﬁcantly sooner than are dramatic upward jumps in CDS.
During our sample period, more than one third of all dramatic upward jumps in
implied volatilities, as deﬁned in (4), were revised downward by 50% or more of their
initial increase within three days. In comparison, less than 18% of dramatic upward
jumps in CDS rates, as deﬁned in (3), were revised downward by 50% or more within
three days of their sudden increase. The average time until a 50% revision of the
45initial increase in IV amounted to 27 days, with a standard deviation of 1.2 days.
For jumps in default swap rates, the average time to a 50% revision was 49.1 days,
with a standard deviation of 2.2 days. The median numbers of days were 7 for IV
jumps and 15 for CDS jumps. This evidence is consistent with options trading on
unsubstantiated rumors more frequently, creating dramatic spikes in options prices
and trading stirs that end in a whimper.
In a theoretical eﬀort to support our conjecture, Section 6 describes a simple model
of information arrival and transmission that explicitly incorporates the notion that
options markets trade on unsubstantiated rumors more often than do default swap
markets. We show that our model, although quite simple, is rich enough to capture
the essence of our empirical ﬁndings.
In summary, this paper provides empirical evidence that both CDS and options
markets often experience abnormal swings prior to the announcement of negative
credit news. With the exclusion of negative earnings announcements, we ﬁnd that
options prices reveal information about such forthcoming adverse events at least as
early as do credit spreads. Prior to certain adverse credit-market events, notably
the disclosure of accounting scandals, we even ﬁnd that the incremental information
revelation in the options market relative to the CDS market is signiﬁcant.
We observe a strong incremental spillover from CDS to equity markets around
adverse earnings releases, and—although with the opposite sign—prior to leveraged
buyout announcements, even after controlling for news revealed in options prices. In
the period prior to negative credit news being publicly disclosed, we ﬁnd that the
equity market does not respond to abnormal movement in options prices unless that
information has also manifested itself in the CDS market. A potential explanation
is that options are more likely to trade on unsubstantiated rumors than are default
swaps. We propose a theoretical model of information arrival and transmission for
credit, options and equity markets that supports our empirical ﬁndings.
46Tables
Table 1: Firm Summary Statistics by Sector. For each of the nine sectors in our sample, we report the number of
ﬁrms, the average number of daily ﬁve-year CDS rate observations per ﬁrm, the median CDS rate in basis points,
and the distribution of the median S&P credit rating for the ﬁrms in that sector. The sample period is January 2002
through November 2006.
Sector Firms No obs Med CDS AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC NR
Basic Materials 10 1,115 41 0 0 5 4 0 1 0 0
Consumer Goods 24 1,152 51 0 2 5 8 2 5 1 1
Consumer Services 14 1,001 65 0 0 1 10 0 3 0 0
Healthcare 20 991 38 1 2 4 10 1 1 0 1
Industrials 18 1,169 42 0 1 8 9 0 0 0 0
Oil & Gas 21 1,117 51 0 0 5 10 4 1 0 1
Technology 10 1,159 74 0 0 4 1 3 1 0 1
Telecommunications 12 863 77 0 0 4 4 2 1 0 1
Utilities 15 1,123 54 0 0 0 12 3 0 0 0
Total sample 144 1,083 50 1% 3% 25% 47% 10% 9% 1% 3%
47Table 2: Summary statistics for ﬁrms with LBO announcement. For each ﬁrm, we report the sector, the LBO
announcement date, the number of daily ﬁve-year CDS rate observations, the median CDS rate, and the median S&P
credit rating. Datastream CDS data is available from January 2003 through December 2006.
Firm sector anmt date no. CDS median CDS median S&P rating
Albertsons Inc Consumer Services 9/2/05 988 80 BBB
Clear Channel Comms Inc Consumer Services 10/26/06 986 93 BBB
Equity Oﬃce Prop Trust Consumer Services 11/21/06 850 44 BBB
Freescale Semiconductor Inc Technology 9/11/06 389 86 BB
HCA Inc Healthcare 7/24/06 835 140 BB
Kinder Morgan Inc Oil & Gas 5/30/06 985 47 BBB
Neiman Marcus Group Inc Consumer Services 3/16/05 910 55 BBB
Toys R Us Inc Consumer Services 3/16/05 816 491 BB
Sabre Group Holdings Inc Consumer Services 12/11/06 919 75 BBB
Univision Comms Inc Consumer Services 6/27/06 157 338 BB
48Table 3: Information ﬂow between CDS and options markets under diﬀerent credit- and options-market conditions. The top panel of the table reports OLS panel estimates
and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the coeﬃcients of the regression
IVrtni




























































in a similar fashion. Results are reported for four choices of condition dummies D•
cond, cond ∈ {∆CDS,∆IV,∆VlmC,∆VlmP}, and three model speciﬁcations (I) ai = a,
bi
t = b, and ci
t = c, (II) bs = cs = 0 and bq = cq = 0, and (III) full model, where the latter uses the Basic Materials sector and the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 as baseline. Note
that the entries for b under columns marked III show the sample average of the quarterly dummy estimates and of their t-statistics. The bottom panel reports the results
of the panel regression above after replacing all instances of IVrtn and CDSinnovi







model spec. I II III I II III I II III I II III
Information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options market
b 0.049 0.050 0.041 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.045 0.035 0.038 0.045 0.034 0.037
(8.820) (8.959) (1.532) (5.427) (5.489) (0.885) (11.165) (8.657) (1.406) (11.215) (8.392) (1.398)
bpre 0.013 −0.008 −0.008 −0.023 −0.035 −0.024 0.045 0.036 0.029 0.043 0.046 0.040
(0.742) (−0.436) (−0.475) (−1.263) (−1.871) (−1.292) (1.935) (1.572) (1.235) (1.880) (2.037) (1.750)
bat −0.034 −0.044 −0.034 0.478 0.441 0.444 0.041 0.028 0.031 0.003 −0.001 −0.012
(−1.250) (−1.613) (−1.227) (22.324) (20.121) (19.821) (1.207) (0.828) (0.894) (0.104) (−0.017) (−0.368)
bpost −0.027 −0.037 −0.021 0.054 0.016 0.029 −0.006 −0.017 −0.020 −0.010 −0.002 −0.013
(−3.422) (−4.659) (−2.381) (5.181) (1.465) (2.391) (−0.259) (−0.792) (−0.930) (−0.477) (−0.106) (−0.603)
bDD – −0.017 −0.014 – −0.023 −0.022 – −0.018 −0.016 – −0.018 −0.015
(−4.317) (−3.217) (−6.116) (−5.164) (−4.763) (−3.660) (−4.645) (−3.510)
bIV – 0.037 0.055 – 0.015 0.034 – 0.040 0.057 – 0.041 0.060
(3.873) (3.912) (1.560) (2.380) (4.302) (4.154) (4.432) (4.342)
bSZ – 0.003 0.006 – 0.011 0.013 – 0.008 0.010 – 0.007 0.009
(0.801) (1.239) (2.823) (3.065) (1.871) (2.142) (1.738) (2.066)
Information ﬂow from the options market to the CDS market
b 0.016 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.044 0.037 0.032 0.042 0.036
(8.333) (12.225) (1.773) (8.861) (13.647) (2.566) (16.774) (21.170) (2.942) (16.091) (20.228) (2.837)
bpre 0.046 0.024 0.016 0.007 0.041 0.023 −0.005 −0.017 −0.017 0.030 0.028 0.023
(4.387) (2.309) (1.506) (0.977) (5.933) (3.120) (−0.481) (−1.561) (−1.559) (3.073) (2.885) (2.352)
bat 0.490 0.455 0.447 0.035 0.023 0.017 0.000 −0.007 −0.004 −0.007 0.021 0.013
(32.657) (29.947) (29.384) (2.865) (1.918) (1.446) (0.014) (−0.379) (−0.209) (−0.462) (1.439) (0.871)
bpost 0.144 0.108 0.102 0.037 0.019 0.010 0.000 −0.006 −0.003 −0.010 −0.016 −0.014
(16.639) (12.099) (11.261) (8.324) (4.355) (2.186) (−0.022) (−0.594) (−0.260) (−1.009) (−1.617) (−1.424)
bDD – 0.003 0.002 – 0.005 0.003 – 0.006 0.003 – 0.006 0.004
(1.883) (0.953) (3.129) (1.800) (3.432) (1.730) (3.690) (1.901)
bIV – 0.048 0.047 – 0.076 0.076 – 0.074 0.074 – 0.074 0.074
(12.332) (9.360) (19.452) (14.859) (19.792) (14.973) (19.810) (14.977)
bSZ – −0.002 −0.001 – −0.005 −0.003 – −0.006 −0.003 – −0.007 −0.003
(−0.890) (−0.379) (−2.351) (−1.332) (−3.043) (−1.420) (−3.307) (−1.554)
4
9Table 4: Information ﬂow between the CDS and options markets by announcement type. The top panel of the table reports OLS panel estimates and t-statistics (in
parentheses) for the coeﬃcients of the regression
IVrtni




























































in a similar fashion. Results are reported for four announcement types (A, E, S, and B) and three model speciﬁcations (I) ai = a, bi
t = b, and ci
t = c, (II) bs = cs = 0
and bq = cq = 0, and (III) full model, where the latter uses the Basic Materials sector and the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 as baseline. Note that the entries for b under columns
marked III show the sample average of the quarterly dummy estimates and of their t-statistics. The bottom panel reports the results of the panel regression above after
replacing all instances of IVrtn and CDSinnovi
o with CDSrtn and CDSinnovi
c, respectively.
cond. dummy A E S B
model spec. I II III I II III I II III I II III
Information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options market
b 0.044 0.035 0.038 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.045 0.035 0.038 0.045 0.035 0.036
(11.239) (8.937) (1.418) (10.447) (8.441) (1.362) (11.735) (8.993) (1.439) (11.638) (8.879) (1.357)
bpre −0.131 −0.162 −0.161 0.005 −0.031 −0.039 −0.018 −0.054 −0.073 0.037 0.027 0.008
(−1.570) (−1.935) (−1.929) (0.143) (−0.845) (−1.050) (−0.253) (−0.756) (−1.010) (0.551) (0.400) (0.118)
bat 0.041 −0.012 −0.074 0.208 0.163 0.169 0.207 0.154 0.104 0.018 0.047 0.032
(0.669) (−0.200) (−1.183) (3.933) (3.074) (3.183) (3.568) (2.646) (1.741) (0.291) (0.776) (0.520)
bpost 0.076 0.002 0.018 0.107 0.057 0.042 −0.147 −0.178 −0.196 0.051 0.014 0.015
(1.644) (0.051) (0.374) (4.542) (2.344) (1.696) (−1.946) (−2.356) (−2.585) (1.186) (0.321) (0.340)
bDD – −0.018 −0.016 – −0.017 −0.015 – −0.018 −0.016 – −0.018 −0.016
(−4.675) (−3.661) (−4.400) (−3.414) (−4.601) (−3.582) (−4.682) (−3.558)
bIV – 0.040 0.056 – 0.037 0.056 – 0.042 0.060 – 0.042 0.059
(4.211) (3.987) (3.932) (4.034) (4.465) (4.342) (4.441) (4.307)
bSZ – 0.008 0.010 – 0.006 0.008 – 0.008 0.010 – 0.007 0.009
(1.860) (2.162) (1.416) (1.814) (1.877) (2.247) (1.811) (2.092)
Information ﬂow from the options market to the CDS market
b 0.029 0.040 0.035 0.032 0.043 0.036 0.033 0.043 0.036 0.033 0.043 0.036
(15.457) (19.825) (2.785) (16.701) (21.210) (2.894) (17.252) (21.501) (2.888) (17.137) (21.369) (2.873)
bpre 0.164 0.138 0.153 0.045 0.022 0.018 0.122 0.110 0.116 0.033 0.036 0.053
(4.145) (3.484) (3.889) (2.294) (1.100) (0.903) (3.287) (2.976) (3.144) (0.959) (1.032) (1.536)
bat 0.493 0.412 0.408 0.018 −0.010 −0.013 −0.119 −0.148 −0.117 0.085 0.080 0.080
(17.795) (14.709) (14.345) (0.767) (−0.412) (−0.564) (−1.920) (−2.399) (−1.898) (1.714) (1.620) (1.623)
bpost 0.093 0.051 0.054 0.010 −0.014 −0.018 −0.022 −0.036 −0.034 −0.050 −0.058 −0.035
(3.177) (1.747) (1.853) (0.547) (−0.741) (−0.976) (−0.634) (−1.053) (−0.987) (−1.407) (−1.626) (−0.993)
bDD – 0.007 0.004 – 0.006 0.003 – 0.006 0.003 – 0.006 0.003
(3.934) (1.994) (3.474) (1.770) (3.429) (1.751) (3.446) (1.749)
bIV – 0.067 0.061 – 0.073 0.074 – 0.074 0.074 – 0.073 0.073
(17.949) (12.230) (19.669) (14.919) (19.789) (14.974) (19.673) (14.888)
bSZ – −0.005 −0.003 – −0.006 −0.003 – −0.006 −0.003 – −0.006 −0.003
(−2.368) (−1.228) (−3.124) (−1.471) (−3.136) (−1.499) (−3.111) (−1.497)
5
0Table 5: Information ﬂow from CDS and options markets to the equity market under diﬀerent credit- and options-market conditions. This table reports OLS panel
estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the coeﬃcients of the regression
STKrtni








































































are deﬁned in a similar fashion. Results are reported for four choices of condition dummies D•
cond, cond ∈ {∆CDS,∆IV,∆VlmC,∆VlmP}, and three model speciﬁcations
(I) ai = a, bi
t = b, di
t = d, and ci
t = c, (II) bs = ds = cs = 0 and bq = dq = cq = 0, and (III) full model, where the latter uses the Basic Materials sector and the ﬁrst quarter






I II III I II III I II III I II III
b −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.008 −0.006 −0.007
(−1.979) (−1.734) (−0.385) (0.123) (0.089) (−0.021) (−4.056) (−2.594) (−0.559) (−4.763) (−3.146) (−0.637)
bpre −0.006 −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.006 −0.003 −0.003 0.021 0.022 0.023
(−0.777) (−0.109) (−0.007) (−0.142) (0.170) (−0.209) (−0.643) (−0.342) (−0.281) (2.183) (2.318) (2.420)
bat −0.028 −0.026 −0.032 −0.102 −0.097 −0.097 −0.013 −0.009 −0.015 −0.010 −0.007 −0.002
(−2.454) (−2.308) (−2.784) (−10.992) (−10.284) (−10.067) (−0.901) (−0.624) (−1.091) (−0.717) (−0.516) (−0.141)
bpost −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 −0.030 −0.025 −0.024 −0.023 −0.021 −0.024 −0.010 −0.012 −0.010
(−0.690) (−0.294) (−0.730) (−6.224) (−4.951) (−4.538) (−2.589) (−2.283) (−2.631) (−1.153) (−1.376) (−1.155)
bDD – 0.007 0.003 – 0.008 0.004 – 0.006 0.003 – 0.006 0.003
(4.068) (1.702) (4.882) (2.245) (3.870) (1.418) (3.994) (1.601)
bIV – −0.015 −0.029 – −0.004 −0.020 – −0.017 −0.031 – −0.017 −0.031
(−3.423) (−4.682) (−0.838) (−3.254) (−4.016) (−5.205) (−3.979) (−5.082)
bSZ – −0.006 −0.005 – −0.005 −0.004 – −0.006 −0.005 – −0.006 −0.006
(−3.522) (−2.807) (−2.944) (−2.331) (−3.634) (−2.890) (−3.712) (−2.970)
d −0.005 −0.007 −0.001 −0.007 −0.010 −0.004 −0.007 −0.009 −0.002 −0.008 −0.010 −0.003
(−4.236) (−5.429) (−0.173) (−4.708) (−6.595) (−0.551) (−6.101) (−6.838) (−0.292) (−6.933) (−7.553) (−0.432)
dpre −0.006 0.000 −0.002 −0.008 −0.015 −0.018 −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(−0.886) (−0.041) (−0.303) (−2.019) (−3.599) (−4.089) (−0.963) (−0.740) (−0.689) (0.920) (0.813) (0.859)
dat −0.055 −0.044 −0.043 0.046 0.049 0.050 −0.028 −0.028 −0.029 0.000 −0.007 −0.005
(−5.423) (−4.231) (−4.118) (6.477) (6.832) (6.903) (−2.522) (−2.435) (−2.569) (−0.030) (−0.732) (−0.511)
dpost −0.031 −0.020 −0.018 −0.005 −0.001 −0.001 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 0.005 0.005 0.001
(−5.912) (−3.616) (−3.187) (−1.973) (−0.502) (−0.234) (−1.184) (−1.232) (−1.267) (0.855) (0.830) (0.194)
dDD – 0.000 0.000 – −0.001 −0.001 – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000
(0.270) (0.356) (−0.545) (−0.450) (−0.014) (0.186) (−0.034) (0.181)
dIV – −0.010 −0.014 – −0.017 −0.021 – −0.013 −0.017 – −0.013 −0.018
(−4.159) (−4.496) (−6.974) (−6.763) (−5.709) (−5.763) (−5.846) (−5.816)
dSZ – 0.004 0.003 – 0.005 0.003 – 0.005 0.003 – 0.005 0.003
(3.470) (1.880) (3.940) (2.118) (4.098) (2.272) (3.926) (2.120)
5
1Table 6: Information ﬂow from CDS and options markets to the equity market by announcement type. This table reports OLS panel estimates and t-statistics (in
parentheses) for the coeﬃcients of the regression
STKrtni








































































are deﬁned in a similar fashion. Results are reported for four announcement types (A, E, S, and B) and three model speciﬁcations (I) ai = a, bi
t = b, di
t = d, and ci
t = c,
(II) bs = ds = cs = 0 and bq = dq = cq = 0, and (III) full model, where the latter uses the Basic Materials sector and the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 as baseline. Note that the
entries for b and d under columns marked III show the sample average of the quarterly dummy estimates and of their t-statistics.
A E S B
I II III I II III I II III I II III
b −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.006 −0.004 −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.008 −0.005 −0.007
(−4.418) (−3.051) (−0.627) (−3.448) (−2.375) (−0.509) (−4.362) (−2.812) (−0.592) (−4.631) (−2.975) (−0.610)
bpre 0.122 0.137 0.138 −0.046 −0.035 −0.029 −0.094 −0.078 −0.073 −0.001 0.008 0.017
(3.407) (3.817) (3.832) (−2.961) (−2.222) (−1.835) (−3.052) (−2.523) (−2.367) (−0.030) (0.284) (0.587)
bat −0.107 −0.099 −0.095 −0.128 −0.111 −0.113 −0.013 0.005 0.013 0.032 0.021 0.025
(−3.849) (−3.532) (−3.321) (−5.619) (−4.846) (−4.928) (−0.434) (0.171) (0.444) (1.201) (0.791) (0.923)
bpost −0.066 −0.042 −0.034 −0.038 −0.024 −0.019 −0.016 −0.006 −0.008 −0.080 −0.072 −0.072
(−3.175) (−1.995) (−1.613) (−3.409) (−2.075) (−1.664) (−0.487) (−0.199) (−0.247) (−4.017) (−3.649) (−3.599)
bDD – 0.006 0.003 – 0.006 0.002 – 0.006 0.002 – 0.006 0.003
(3.857) (1.609) (3.455) (1.175) (3.450) (1.340) (4.015) (1.661)
bIV – −0.016 −0.030 – −0.015 −0.029 – −0.016 −0.030 – −0.017 −0.030
(−3.873) (−4.893) (−3.475) (−4.779) (−3.942) (−4.926) (−4.033) (−4.970)
bSZ – −0.006 −0.006 – −0.005 −0.005 – −0.006 −0.005 – −0.006 −0.005
(−3.769) (−3.077) (−3.057) (−2.437) (−3.338) (−2.763) (−3.667) (−2.847)
d −0.007 −0.009 −0.003 −0.008 −0.009 −0.003 −0.008 −0.010 −0.003 −0.008 −0.010 −0.003
(−6.490) (−7.439) (−0.411) (−6.571) (−7.428) (−0.452) (−7.128) (−7.883) (−0.400) (−6.952) (−7.638) (−0.420)
dpre −0.012 −0.004 −0.009 −0.006 −0.001 −0.001 −0.020 −0.020 −0.020 0.018 0.014 0.010
(−0.435) (−0.137) (−0.314) (−0.485) (−0.065) (−0.042) (−0.865) (−0.900) (−0.864) (0.842) (0.678) (0.488)
dat −0.047 −0.023 0.003 0.010 0.018 0.022 0.088 0.092 0.098 0.005 0.003 −0.001
(−1.972) (−0.954) (0.126) (0.673) (1.206) (1.448) (2.301) (2.400) (2.544) (0.173) (0.114) (−0.036)
dpost 0.002 0.013 0.005 −0.025 −0.020 −0.020 −0.023 −0.024 −0.024 0.001 −0.003 −0.004
(0.091) (0.693) (0.277) (−2.140) (−1.737) (−1.726) (−1.112) (−1.117) (−1.157) (0.044) (−0.150) (−0.184)
dDD – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000
(−0.076) (0.191) (−0.074) (0.176) (0.013) (0.183) (0.052) (0.261)
dIV – −0.013 −0.018 – −0.013 −0.017 – −0.014 −0.019 – −0.013 −0.017
(−5.601) (−5.786) (−5.674) (−5.745) (−6.114) (−6.172) (−5.799) (−5.811)
dSZ – 0.005 0.003 – 0.005 0.003 – 0.005 0.003 – 0.005 0.003
(3.956) (2.144) (3.950) (2.072) (4.313) (2.424) (3.896) (2.078)
5
2Table 7: Information ﬂow between the CDS, options, and equity markets around LBO announcements. This table reports OLS panel estimates and t-statistics (in
parentheses) for the coeﬃcients of the regression
STKrtni





































































t , and ci
t and di
t are
deﬁned in a similar fashion. Results are reported in columns seven through nine for three model speciﬁcations (I) ai = a, bi
t = b, di
t = d, and ci
t = c, (II) bs = ds = cs = 0
and bq = dq = cq = 0, and (III) full model, where the latter uses the Basic Materials sector and the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 as baseline. In columns one through three, we
show the results for the information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options market and in columns four through six the results for the information ﬂow from the options
market to the CDS market are reported. Note that the entries for b and d under columns marked III show the sample average of the quarterly dummy estimates and of
their t-statistics.
response IVrtn CDSrtn STKrtn
model spec. I II III I II III I II III
b 0.045 0.035 0.020 0.042 0.041 0.030 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(10.560) (7.557) (0.795) (20.659) (18.221) (2.597) (−2.780) (−2.754) (−0.461)
bpre 1.202 1.191 1.164 0.302 0.291 0.320 0.100 0.101 0.100
(7.266) (7.190) (7.001) (4.776) (4.601) (5.058) (2.113) (2.136) (2.119)
bat −3.553 −3.569 −3.562 −0.017 −0.065 −0.041 0.040 0.043 0.038
(−14.844) (−14.893) (−14.831) (−0.103) (−0.385) (−0.243) (0.404) (0.435) (0.384)
bpost −0.087 −0.078 −0.076 −0.156 −0.118 −0.116 0.015 0.014 0.008
(−5.986) (−5.246) (−3.927) (−2.710) (−2.034) (−1.978) (1.175) (1.062) (0.524)
bDD – −0.017 −0.016 – 0.006 0.004 – 0.005 0.002
(−4.086) (−3.573) (3.141) (2.162) (3.188) (1.259)
bIV – 0.020 0.044 – 0.073 0.075 – −0.020 −0.033
(1.819) (3.036) (19.061) (14.931) (−4.372) (−5.390)
bSZ – 0.004 0.007 – −0.006 −0.004 – −0.006 −0.006
(1.016) (1.674) (−2.771) (−1.748) (−3.606) (−3.363)
d −0.010 −0.009 −0.006
(−7.753) (−6.746) (−1.002)
dpre 0.023 0.026 0.018
(0.446) (0.498) (0.350)
dat 0.494 0.487 0.475
(3.464) (3.405) (3.325)
dpost 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.076) (0.090) (0.091)
dDD – 0.000 0.000
(0.208) (0.324)
dIV – −0.013 −0.016
(−5.626) (−5.534)
dSZ – 0.005 0.003
(4.035) (2.601)
5
3Table 8: Model speciﬁcations for simulation study of information arrival and transition in CDS, options and equity













2 . A “x”




2 . κo,R is set equal to Φ−1(0.99)σo.
The remaining parameters were calibrated so as to mimic our tests in Sections 4 and 5 as closely as possible. In
particular, we use all 150,000 (ﬁrm,date) pairs in our sample to estimate the model structure in (15) through (17),
after removing all event dummies. This gives us the following parameter estimates: κc = −0.0003, κc,c = 0.0904,
κc,o = 0.0129, κc,e = −0.0934, σc = 0.0310, κo = 0.0009, κo,c = 0.0153, κo,o = −0.1969, κo,e = −0.2075, σo =
0.0445, κe = 0.0004, κe,c = −0.0029, κe,o = −0.0063, κe,e = −0.0156, σe = 0.0195, ρc,o = 0.0653, ρc,e = −0.0851 and
ρo,e = −0.3027. The return series are initialized at their sample average, that is, CDSrtn1 = −0.0004, IVrtn1 = 0.0006
and STKrtn1 = 0.0003. News and rumors arrive according to two independent Poisson processes with intensities lE
and lR, respectively. We set lE = 0.01 and lR = 0.005 to match the average frequency of upward jumps in CDS












M1 x – – x – –
M2 x – – – x –
M3 x – – – – x
M4 – x – x – –
M5 – x – – x –
M6 – x – – – x
M7 – – x x – –
M8 – – x – x –
M9 – – x – – x
M10 1/4 x 3/4 x – – 1/4 x 3/4 x
M11 – 3/4 x 1/4 x 7/8 x – 1/8 x
κe,E = Φ−1(0.99)σe
M12 – 1/4 x 3/4 x – 3/4 x 1/4 x
54Table 9: Simulation study of information arrival and transition in CDS, options and equity markets. We simulate from the framework in (16), (15) and (17), using the
model speciﬁcations described in Table 8. Based on the simulated return series, we compute CDS and IV innovations as deﬁned in Section 2.2.1, but with only one
lag and by ignoring the interaction with DDt. This table reports OLS panel estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) for the coeﬃcients of three sets of regressions:




• (t) by bpre DE
t+1 + bat DE









model spec. M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Information ﬂow from the CDS market to the options market
b 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.024
(6.951) (7.613) (7.784) (6.217) (6.033) (6.125) (6.062) (6.245) (6.174) (6.558) (6.334) (6.331)
bpre -0.013 -0.027 -0.024 -0.004 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 1.206 -0.016 -0.034 -0.028 0.992
(-0.349) (-0.700) (-0.613) (-0.111) (-0.436) (-0.420) (-0.888) (76.674) (-0.560) (-0.892) (-0.828) (45.461)
bat -0.114 -0.071 -0.060 1.186 -0.064 -0.023 -0.130 -0.060 -0.054 -0.046 1.258 -0.100
(-3.032) (-1.906) (-1.604) (75.330) (-2.177) (-1.302) (-3.436) (-1.644) (-1.421) (-2.143) (63.933) (-2.713)
Information ﬂow from the options market to the CDS market
b 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026
(14.620) (14.205) (13.924) (14.762) (13.955) (14.257) (13.561) (13.919) (13.898) (14.286) (13.901) (14.198)
bpre -0.003 0.013 -0.014 -0.019 -0.015 0.572 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.504 0.199 0.042
(-0.146) (0.774) (-1.795) (-1.079) (-0.854) (76.549) (-0.107) (0.040) (-0.465) (54.434) (11.728) (2.443)
bat -0.009 0.576 -0.100 0.004 -0.008 0.026 0.002 0.025 0.007 0.042 0.009 -0.037
(-0.504) (77.213) (-5.738) (0.248) (-0.540) (1.508) (0.126) (3.043) (0.391) (2.443) (0.551) (-3.313)
Information ﬂow from CDS and options markets to the equity market
b -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.973) (-1.039) (-0.971) (-1.526) (-1.477) (-1.565) (-1.653) (-1.627) (-1.578) (-1.444) (-1.558) (-1.187)
bpre 0.025 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.026 0.024 -0.520 -0.520 -0.259 0.029 -0.114 0.455
(1.481) (1.364) (1.423) (1.701) (1.597) (1.478) (-76.346) (-76.352) (-20.979) (1.764) (-7.932) (48.626)
bat 0.040 0.072 0.013 -0.524 -0.273 -0.541 0.055 0.053 0.044 -0.586 0.005 0.022
(2.417) (4.503) (0.824) (-77.013) (-21.598) (-76.181) (3.452) (3.323) (2.731) (-60.807) (0.494) (1.374)
d -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(-5.547) (-6.063) (-5.951) (-5.568) (-6.147) (-6.050) (-5.468) (-5.998) (-6.062) (-6.116) (-5.565) (-5.651)
dpre -0.013 -0.016 0.006 -0.017 -0.015 0.005 -0.018 -0.013 -0.232 0.006 -0.068 0.077
(-1.127) (-1.430) (1.168) (-1.484) (-1.360) (1.094) (-1.628) (-1.152) (-29.241) (1.038) (-6.219) (7.057)
dat 0.017 -0.359 0.025 0.032 -0.221 0.029 -0.020 -0.016 0.017 -0.118 -0.011 0.079
(1.473) (-75.660) (2.224) (2.828) (-27.214) (2.616) (-1.878) (-1.746) (1.573) (-10.749) (-0.965) (10.001)
5
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Figure 2: Returns on CDS, options, and stock on Delphi around the March 7, 2005 announcement of further accounting
problems. Source: Markit, OptionMetrics, and CRSP.


















































Figure 3: The ﬁgure shows the elasticity of credit spreads s with respect to the value of equity E, deﬁned by
(ds/s)/(dE/E) computed under the Black–Scholes–Merton framework of corporate default. Assuming an asset volatil-
ity of sig, we price a zero-coupon bond with face value of 100 that matures ﬁve years from now. The risk-free interest
rate is set equal to 4%. The top panel plots the credit spread elasticity over the inverse of the level of credit spreads.
The bottom panel displays the credit spread elasticity as a function of the ﬁrm’s risk-neutral distance to default.
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Figure 4: The ﬁrst graph in the top panel shows the distribution, across ﬁrms and time, of upward jumps in IV (as
deﬁned in (4)) for ﬁve days before until ﬁve days after an upward jump in CDS rates (as deﬁned in (3)). The second
graph in the top panel shows the distribution of upward jumps in CDS rates for ﬁve days before until ﬁve days after
an upward jump in IV. Similarly for all other subplots.
































































































Figure 5: Distribution, across ﬁrms and time, of upward jumps in CDS rates (as deﬁned in (3)) and in IV (as deﬁned
in (4)) for ﬁve days before until ﬁve days after the announcement, for each type of announcement.








































































































Figure 6: Distribution, across ﬁrms and time, of upward jumps in call-option volume and in put-option volume (as
deﬁned in (5)) for ﬁve days before until ﬁve days after the announcement, for each type of announcement.









Firms with Type A announcements




Firms with Type L announcements
Figure 7: Cross-correlation between percentage changes in CDS rates at time t and percentage changes in implied
volatilities at time t+k, for k = −5,...,5, as a function of k. The top panel uses all ﬁrms in our sample. The middle
(bottom) panel uses ﬁrms for which at least one Type A (Type L) announcement was made during the sample period.
In each panel, the cross-correlations for individual ﬁrms are averaged across ﬁrms.











Firms with Type A announcements





Firms with Type L announcements
Figure 8: Cross-correlation between percentage changes in CDS rates at time t and stock returns at time t + k, for
k = −5,...,5, as a function of k. The top panel uses all ﬁrms in our sample. The middle (bottom) panel uses
ﬁrms for which at least one Type A (Type L) announcement was made during the sample period. In each panel, the
cross-correlations for individual ﬁrms are averaged across ﬁrms.
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Firms with Type L announcements
Figure 9: Cross-correlation between percentage changes in implied volatilities at time t and stock returns at time
t + k, for k = −5,...,5, as a function of k. The top panel uses all ﬁrms in our sample. The middle (bottom) panel
uses ﬁrms for which at least one Type A (Type L) announcement was made during the sample period. In each panel,
the cross-correlations for individual ﬁrms are averaged across ﬁrms.




























































A E S B L
Figure 10: Quarterly dummy multipliers for innovations in CDS rates (top panel) and IV (bottom panel), as estimated
for model speciﬁcation III of (14), with • ∈ {A,E,S,B,L}.
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